# AFF -- Rememory

# 1AC

#### “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

#### They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

#### They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.”

(NATO, 4-1-1949, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\_texts\_17120.htm, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki

#### This debate begins deep within the archives of this resolution. This debate begins in 1949, at the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This debate begins with the unseen underside of enlightened modernity, with the strands of gratuitous violence we trace across time, with the perpetual accumulation of fungible African life and lives, with the invisible relations of colonial sociopolitical dominance. This debate begins at the start of 73 fateful years in which, like imperial clockwork, the world ended every day.

#### From its inception, the North Atlantic Treaty belonged to whiteness. Ask yourself which African national leaders were present at the founding of the militaristic organizations you invest in – the answer is none. The world was built from the ground up by the expropriated labor of the transatlantic slave trade, and as the bricks of imperial sovereignty were laid upon each other by black lives lived under an international regime of neo-slavery, a new world order was born.

#### The epistemic framework of coloniality undergirds NATO’s relationship to Africa – the promotion of Euro-American governance and thought systems through NATO initiatives inscribes the power relations of colonialism onto the world.

Nyere ’20 -- (Chidochashe Nyere, 01-2020, "NATO’s 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonialism Repackaged?," Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa (pp.123-156), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335080330\_NATO%27s\_2011\_Invasion\_of\_Libya\_Colonialism\_Repackaged, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Coloniality as a Framework for Theorising Africa Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 7) defines coloniality as the “dark side of modernity” that has been consistently packaged to camouflage the inconsistency and discrepancy between the rhetoric of modernity and the lived experience thereof. While modernity esteems values of democracy, human rights, progress and development, the implementation of these values is often violent and disastrous when outside the Western Hemisphere— the Euro-North American-centric space and geography. One wonders if this rhetoric of the universal human rights covers spaces and places outside Europe and North America—the epitome of the Western world. Coloniality is therefore the rationale that gives rise and justifies colonialism. Coloniality is the software of colonialism; the latter being the physical and violent conquering of a people/civilisation by another, arising from the former. Coloniality could also be understood as the after-effects of colonialism; it refers to “long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 487). The concept of coloniality of power is a particular strand that lies within the broader decolonial theory; it is informed and attributed to Peruvian national and Professor of Sociology Anibal Quijano who identified four levers of coloniality. The first is “control of the economy”. The second is “control of authority”. The third is “control of gender and sexuality”. The fourth is “control of knowledge and subjectivity” (quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 487). Mignolo (2001: 424) submits that, it is the “colonial experiences” that “outlived decolonisation” and thereby continue to provide a template of thought and action that reproduces colonial-like forms that is problematic; and these patterns or structures constitute coloniality of power. The patterns that emerged as a result of colonialism and continue to fester and consolidate modern empire and its operations are constitutive of coloniality of power. At the centre of control is power, hence the concept of coloniality of power. “As the centre of global capitalism, Europe not only had control of the world market, but it was also able to impose its colonial dominance over all the regions and populations of the planet, incorporating them into its world-system and its specific model of power” (Mignolo 2001: 424). It is this concept of coloniality of power that this study will appropriate in analysing the application of Right to Protect (R2P) in the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011 mindful that this study seeks to establish and determine whether or not, the Libyan invasion was linked to the dynamics of coloniality of power. According to Quijano (quoted in Grosfoguel 2000: 368), coloniality of power is the classification of people through “historical process of colonial/racial domination”. Coloniality of power is manifested especially after the independence of former colonised countries in the form of the continuation of “control of economic, cultural, and political structures of society” (Quijano 1993 quoted in Grosfoguel 2000: 368). Grosfoguel adds that the continuation of “power relations from colonial to postcolonial times allowed the white elites to classify populations and to exclude people of colour from categories of full citizenship in the imagined community called the ‘nation’” (2000: 368). Civil liberties, rights and privileges of citizenship were never truly extended to colonial subjects such as Blacks, Indians, Mulattoes and Mestizos. The control of the internal grouping of populations by colonialism is the perpetuation of colonialism in abstentia. This is the essence of coloniality of power. Kissinger (2014: 2-3) echoes what Mignolo (2001) observed that coloniality of power is represented by the long-standing patterns that emerged as a result of colonialism; he argues that “what passes for order in our time was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago, at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilisations”, such as Africa. Yet, the so-called world wars involved Africans as foot soldiers who were used as proxies of the global powers. They required of Africa cheap (military) labour for the industrialised and capitalist world. South Africa, under the apartheid regime, sent its contingent comprising of more than 600 Black men who were to perish at sea when their ship, the SS Mendi sunk on route to participating in World War I on 21 February 1918, yet South Africa, as part of Africa,1 had nothing to do with World War I, for example (South African Navy 2014). Europe is unquestionably the originator and epicentre of the crafting of colonial conditions that were to be “approximated” globally to what is now understood as the contemporary world order. In other words, a particular, subjective, shallow and narrow perspective, and to use Kissinger’s words, “an accident” of Europe’s imagination of order “became the hallmarks of a new system of international order” (Kissinger 2014: 3). This is essentially where coloniality of power lies, in Europe’s accident that “shaped and prefigured the modern” times of Europe into a universally pertinent structure (ibid.: 4). It is this universally/globally appurtenant structure that determines the global power structural configuration. It is prefigured and can only be re-configured by the originator—Europe and its allies, particularly the USA and much of the Western world. Europe’s allies often endorse and never are opposed to this global power structural configuration that is inherently asymmetrical in favour of the Euro-North American-centric alliance’ perspective. Anyone/entity that dare oppose the global power structural configuration is dealt with violently, including death, as was President Muammar Gaddafi. This makes Europe an empire. In other words, Europe’s accident was scattered across the globe in an intentional and malicious manner that sought to expand Europe’s influence and territory. Contemporary global society is ordered around the patterns that emerged from British colonialism of America and the rest of the world. America, hence, became the prototype of a colonial state. Kissinger (2014: 6) points out that “in time, the US would become the indispensable defender of the order Europe designed”. The USA will defend the system that Europe designed because it was included in the prefiguring of the global power structural configuration based on the imagined superiority of race, and hence races were ordered hierarchically with the White race occupying the apex of the hierarchy. The influence that Britain and America have in the contemporary world order is unparalleled. The Euro-North American-centric orientation is thus monolithic and imposing. Today’s society is dominated by Europe and North America as the two protagonists of the current world order or the global power structural configuration. Kissinger further reveals that “in the American view of world order, peace and balance would occur naturally, and ancient enmities would be set aside – once other nations were given the same principles say in their own governance that Americans had in theirs” (Kissinger 2014: 6). But, who are ‘they’ that give other nations those so-called American principles? What Kissinger reveals here is that America sees itself as part of the design team of the global world order. It too, is above the world system as it is the designer of the current world order. The Euro-North Americancentric modernity hence is supra the global power structural configuration because it prefigured it. It cannot be that the designer of a thing will be governed by the same rules that govern the designed thing. In 1648, the doctrine of sovereignty was officially codified and conferred sovereign rights and autonomy to all states. All states were to be treated as equal in authority as sovereigns in their domains and in relation to other sovereigns, regardless of economic stature or arsenal power. Yet in 1815–1886, this sovereignty was denied to Africa. Kissinger intones the double-standards of Europe in the haphazard and spurious application of the principle of sovereignty; he argues that “they [Europeans] often neglected to apply concepts of sovereignty to the colonies and colonised peoples” (Kissinger 2014: 6). Since the current global power structural configuration was an idea of Europe, it is only the Euro-North American-centric modernity that can reconfigure the design because this modernity is outside the design. To evince this assertion, it is argued that “Europe has set out to depart from the state-system itself designed and to transcend it through a concept of pooled sovereignty” (Kissinger 2014:7). The European Union (EU) is the case in point; ironically, Gaddafi was calling for a United Africa (UA) at the time of his assassination. Admittedly, the utility value of these institutions (EU, AU, UN, etc.) lies in that they have potency to provide an even-handed and impartial framework for the engagement of a diverse community of states, if handled fairly, justly and with symmetrical influence of the involved parties (Kissinger 2014: 7). The current global power structural configuration was an invention of Europe, and as the architect of this system of world governance, Europe championed the “balance of power concept” with itself as the author and adjudicator of that system (Kissinger 2004: 7). This reveals the genesis of the asymmetrical power configuration in this ‘new world order’ system. This means that the rationale of colonialism is coloniality. Coloniality propelled the Europeans to conquer other civilisations in order to impose their sense of order on every ‘other’ civilisation. The Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed in 1648, indicating the official codification of the doctrine of state sovereignty. The Berlin West Africa Conference, known for the slogan ‘Scramble for Africa’ occurred in 1885–1887 (Iliffe 1979; Pakenham 1992; Chamberlain 2010). The Versailles Treaty was signed in 1919 signalling the end of World War I (Kissinger 2014: 24) demonstrating the European doublestandards and asymmetrical power relations. This also speaks of the inconsistencies of European modernity. The double-standards applied by Europe in its interactions with the rest of the world are conspicuous. Another example of this is that the same European-centric worldview developed international law. International law entailed that “if a state would accept these basic requirements, it could be recognised as an international citizen able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion and internal policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention” (Kissinger 2014: 27). Europe as the self-appointed architect, arbiter and adjudicator of states’ behaviours considered international law “as an expandable body of agreed doctrine aimed at the cultivation of harmony, with the Westphalian treaties themselves at its heart” (Kissinger 2014: 27). It can be deduced, therefore, that international law was designed for Europe and had only Europe at the centre of its creation and intended application, which then explains why international law was not upheld at the Berlin West Africa Conference, Africa was partitioned to the whims of European imperial powers without any consequence. This renders international law whim some as it is selectively applied, revealing the impunity of international law. International law speaks of recognition as the precondition for the acceptance of a state in the fold of the international community of states. It consequently speaks of being shielded and protected from external intervention. Recognised by who? Shielded from who? This is problematic for the African polity. How can an imposed order maintain a culture, politics and internal processes of African ecologies and localities, when an outside imposition has already been put? If a state does not accept or conform, it is not protected from outside intervention. Is this not colo- niality of power at its highest expression? Europe is the recogniser of states and therefore the guarantor of political independence of states; Europe is the power that recognises states, protects states and policies states into conformity and order. The European civilisation is the ordering state, from which all order is derived. Such is the control that Europe has on the current global power structural configuration. This undoubtedly makes Europe an Empire. A British Statesman, Lord Palmaston, once quipped that “our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (quoted in Kissinger 2014: 29–30). Europe prescribes what order is and what it is not, if a state conforms to the prescribed order it is insulated from Europe’s wrath, but a deviant state is meted with violence. The problem with the order of Europe is that it is foible and it varies and changes depending on whom is in question. The Euro-North Americancentric modernity is not even apologetic about this matter. Kissinger evinces the rationale behind this arrogance; he notes, “we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the interests of our country one’s guiding principle” (Kissinger 2014: 30). This, in fact, is not a principle because it is whim some, always depending on circumstances; should a principle not be mandible depending on circumstance(s)?

#### We begin at the conclusion of the war that prompted NATO’s foundation, with the nations that would soon become part of history’s most deadly apparatus of eliminatory imperialistic violence.

#### May 8, 1945.

#### Demonstrators gathered in Setif, Algeria to celebrate the defeat of Nazi Germany and protest French colonial rule. As the cries for an independent Algeria swelled, as the Algerian flags were flown, a French military offensive incited a massacre. Bouzid Saal, a 22 year old native Algerian, refused to lay down his flag of liberation. A French soldier shot him dead in seconds. In 15 days 44 villages were plundered and purged of life. In 15 days the blood of 45000 indigenous African people was shed.

#### January 21, 2021.

#### The office of President Emmanuel Macron declares that there will be “no repentance or apologies” for atrocities committed in Algeria during 132 years of colonial rule or 8 years of brutal counter-insurgent warfare. He further insinuates that Algeria as a nation was nonexistent prior to 1830, the start of French colonial rule, and that the decolonial history of indigenous movements was a revisionist fabrication.

#### Colonial imperialism is not an event of the past, it is past present and future united in an unbroken continuum of violence.

#### February 28, 1948.

#### African veterans of the second world war gathered in Ghana to peaceful protest mistreatment at the hands of the British government, boycotting their imported goods and demanding benefits for their service. As demonstrators marched towards the capital, the British military opened fire. By March 1st, a state of emergency was declared and the Riot Act was instituted to subdue the people’s protest. By March 12th the leading members of the resistance were incarcerated in remote parts of Northern Ghana.

#### One year later British leaders sat at the negotiating table when the Washington Treaty was signed.

#### February 17, 2011.

#### NATO took it upon themselves to build the perfect storm, a confluence of conditions so severe it would not only rationalize but necessitate the existence and engagement of their global war machine.

#### After the prospect of nationalization of the oil industry was raised, after Libya’s new government stood with anti-imperial movements for African sovereignty, after NATO constructed the conditions for counter-revolutionary violence from both sides, funding militaristic fascist groups as well as engaging in facetious diplomatic cooperation with Muhammar al-Gaddafi, ground operations in Libya began.

#### March 19, 2011.

#### A seven month campaign of blanket bombing began in which civilians, rebels, and military forces alike were murdered indiscriminately.

#### “We are doing it to protect the civilian population from the murderous madness of a regime that in killing its own people has lost all legitimacy.” – Nicolas Sarkozy

#### “(Intervention) is to protect civilians and it is to provide access for humanitarian assistance.” – Hilary Clinton

(Reuters Staff, 3-19-2011, "Factbox: Key quotes from world leaders on Libya," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-summit-quotes/factbox-key-quotes-from-world-leaders-on-libya-idUSTRE72I3YT20110319, accessed 7-5-2022) -- nikki

#### In the wake of NATO and the West lay over 100,000 bodies killed by over 7,700 precision guided bombs, over 2 million people displaced from their homes, and a nation enveloped in chaos where every year, thousands die.

#### Those who scripted this resolution would rather you forget. After all, colonial violence occurs on the margins, in a zone of space-time apart from modernity, it falls outside of history.

#### Africa is the perpetual ghost of the Euro-American regime, located in the blind spot of imperial international relations, in a zone of sacrifice –a paradigmatic reframing of the theories that undergird modern rational discourse is necessary.

Nyere ’20 -- (Chidochashe Nyere, 01-2020, "NATO’s 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonialism Repackaged?," Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa (pp.123-156), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335080330\_NATO%27s\_2011\_Invasion\_of\_Libya\_Colonialism\_Repackaged, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Coloniality of Power and the Global Power Structural Configuration: Unmasking the Politics and Philosophy of Empire Epistemologically, this chapter seeks to unmask the fault lines of the philosophy of the European-centric empire as implicated in the generation of problems epitomised by the invasion of Libya in 2011 by NATO forces. It seeks to do so, by exposing some myths that informed, fueled and continue to precipitate global coloniality in the absence of physical colonialism. Current international relations (IR) theories have proven to be limited and unable to solve and eradicate this epistemic challenge, partly because dominant and traditional IR theories are located in the very European modernity that they disguise and camouflage in the purported objectivity of science. The philosophy of the Eurocentric empire universalised these particular theories of IR by force (violence of colonialism) as they are part of the modernity project of colonisation (Howe 1990: 677). The chapter further aims to demonstrate the deficiency and bankruptcy that foregrounds traditional IR theories’ assumptions, assertions and proclamations particularly that Western-centric IR theories are scientific, objective and universally applicable or replicable. Such proclamations overlook the fact that these IR theories are located in particular ecologies of Europe and therefore, are subjective. All knowledge is particular and subjective to its ecology or locality. Since 1919, the official initial academic inquiry of IR as a discipline, IR theories have not adequately addressed what the discipline initially set out to do—to curb and liquidate international conflict. This suggests that the epistemologies (particular epistemic ecologies and localities) that have informed IR theories to date are inadequate and have reached some sort of cul-de-sac, or a dead-end. These epistemologies beg the question and engage in circular reasoning. This necessitates an alternative frame of reference. Contingent upon Albert Einstein’s idea that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result each time, this chapter opts to engage a non-conventional theory in the discipline of IR. As such, this work advances the decolonial perspective as a possible solution to problems caused by epistemologies located in the ecologies and localities of Western, Euro-North American-centric modernity that purport themselves as objective, scientific and universal. The chapter will unmask the inadequacies of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the face of mounting and current global problems, particularly those played out in the field of international relations. IR as an academic discipline started in 1919 at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University), a year after the end of World War I (Ziegler 1987). This, however, as Nyere (2014: 18) argues, “does not mean that intellectual origins of political realism and liberalism only started in 1919”. The main objective and aim of IR theorising was solely to find peaceful solutions to international disputes and therefore avert a similar conflict to World War I. IR failed in that regard because just barely after a decade, World War II started. Like the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, IR as an academic discipline has failed in achieving what it set out to do in the first place. Since 1945, the end of World War II and the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, USA, there has not been a single decade that the world has not witnessed an international conflict or war (Bennet 1998: 7). Rational theories in the discipline of IR, such as realism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism and constructivism, are expressive of ideas, concepts and views located in modernity. The ideas expressed in IR rational theories are embodied by scholars that are mainly located in modernity, particularly from the Global North and reflect the rationale of European modernity. The major problem of modernity is the inexplicable discrepancy and inconsistency between its rhetoric and its lived reality, its illusion vis-à-vis its essence, particularly from the experience of people of the Global South in general, but by Africans in particular. As such, this chapter intends to unmask the inadequacy of mainstream theories and lenses in explaining the ghosts and blindspots of empire because these ghosts and blind-spots are born within the empire. The European-centric empire is not sufficiently able to be reflexive on its theories and to see beyond its assumptions and assertions. As such, this chapter suggests the need to explore outside the lenses of established theory.

#### Transnational military governance is not a material construct but rather a historical sociology of hegemonic security management that takes shape on the level of representational politics – the resolution is indebted to a methodology of Euro-American liberal rationalism that is inextricably intertwined with African neocolonialism.

Honke and Muller ’12 -- (Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller, 10-2012, "Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of 'local' practice," Security Dialogue Vol. 43, No. 5, Special issue on "Governing (in)security in the postcolonial world" (OCTOBER 2012), pp. 383-401, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26301927?saml\_data=eyJzYW1sVG9rZW4iOiI1Y2EzNWE3MC00OWFkLTRiNzctOTVlOC02MjA0ZDlhNWRlNjgiLCJlbWFpbCI6InVtMTkzNTM1QHVtaWNoLmVkdSIsImluc3RpdHV0aW9uSWRzIjpbImJhYzI1OTdlLTI3YzMtNGIyNy04YzJhLTE3NDlkOWUyYjI1NSIsIjM2MjdjZWE2LTM1YmItNDJkNS04M2ZmLTY4ZmY5ZDc4NDhiZCJdfQ, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Transnational (in)security governance through the lens of postcoloniality We claim that the point of departure for any research endeavour sensitive to the postcolonial condition of contemporary forms of transnational (in)security governance consists in what authors in other fields have called ‘provincializing’ (Chakrabarty, 2000) or ‘decolonizing’ (Rodríguez et al., 2010) security studies. This means avoiding practices of analytical othering by emphasizing the analytical ‘limits of the European experience’ (Wong, 1997). Seth (2009) contrasts two strategies in this regard: One consists in providing a different account of history through the lens of historical sociology. The other, informed by postcolonial theory, implies showing the limitations and non-universality of European analytical categories. While the latter tradition thus sensitizes us to the fact that ‘the central categories of the social sciences are the product of a European history and are not necessarily adequate everywhere, even in their amended versions’ (Seth, 2009: 336), historical sociology, according to Seth, can provide original accounts of subaltern or non-European history. Seth, however, is more in favour of the postcolonial approach and argues that non-Eurocentric historical sociology is mainly about ‘producing “better” knowledge on the grounds that it more accurately re-presents what really happened’. By missing the fact that knowledge is not only about re-presenting the world but also about creating it, historical sociology, according to Seth (2009: 336), tends to produce an external relationship between knowledge and object, a situation that, in contrast to postcolonial studies, the discipline seems incapable of overcoming. In contrast to such a rather rigid juxtaposition, we think that taking historical sociology seriously is indispensable for a postcolonial security studies research programme, but that in order to unfold its anti-Western-centric potential, historical sociology, national as well as international, must engage more deeply with postcolonial studies. As Boatcă and Costa (2010: 14) have argued in their call for a ‘decolonized’ sociology, it is through such an approximation between sociology and postcolonial studies that the epistemological limits of sociology that are the result of a particular academic and epistemological institutionalization of the discipline, and ‘that so far have prevented the emergence of a global sociology of colonial, neocolonial and postcolonial contexts’, can be overcome. It is such a ‘decolonized’ historical sociology through which ‘historical contextualization as a postcolonial method’ (Boatcă and Costa, 2010: 17) can be productively integrated into a postcolonial security studies research programme,2 by highlighting subaltern knowledge and entangled histories of non-Western societies. Decolonized historical sociology can also call our attention to phenomena that, while frequently considered to be occurring only beyond the West, characterize Western societies themselves, including, for example, areas hardly reached by the state and where the state’s monopoly of force is absent or strongly compromised (e.g. marginalized urban spaces, such as the banlieues in France, ETA strongholds in Basque country, and urban and rural spaces controlled by the mafia in Italy or with forms of vigilante justice in the United States). Taking such insights seriously illustrates the limitations of analytical categories bound to the idea of a Western-centric methodological nationalism for understanding (in)security governance even in our contemporary world more generally. Consequently, our critique of Western-centric analytical categories does not imply a call for abandoning all Western theory. Without denying that much, if not most, European theory is marked by the above-mentioned problems stemming from Occidentalism and Western-centrism, instead of simply abandoning these theories, we share Bhabha’s (1994: 18–28) ‘commitment to theory’. While challenging the ‘fictitious universalism’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 65) of Western theories, such a commitment, in our understanding, enhances their analytical scope through what Jackson, following Hall, called ‘theoretical transculturation’. This implies ‘demonstrating that such [Western] theory does not in fact describe or map the entire planet, and that despite pretensions to universalism it suffers from gaps and lacunae, and for this reason needs to be revised in the light of local empirical conditions’ (Jackson, 2003: 73). But the argument for provincializing security studies can even be pushed further. Writing from an African perspective, Mbembe and Nutall (2004: 348) argue that our task is not simply to demonstrate the fallacies of knowledge derived from a particular European experience, but rather to engage in a ‘worlding’ of the African experience. Africa is fraught as an idea and object of academic research, as it has become a sign in public debates for the ‘other’, the ‘failed’, the ‘incomplete’ and something apart from the world, probably more so than Latin America and Asia. Constructed as ‘out of the world’ by policymakers and academics, a postcolonial security studies perspective would require ‘reinscribing’ African (in)security knowledge, experiences and practices into the world and thereby depicting these as ‘normal’ and relevant parts of the human experience, not an exotic exception. This would imply recognizing the African experience of ‘indeterminancy’, ‘provisionality’, ‘contingency’ and uncertainty as a basic condition of life, and as a reality that requires analytical lenses and gives rise to relevant research questions in its own right (Mbembe and Nutall, 2004: 349). Recent scholarship in urban studies has not only stressed the ‘ordinary’ character of (postcolonial) urban experiences across the world (Robinson, 2006) but also suggests that postcolonial cities like Shanghai, Dubai or Lusaka, rather than Western cities, might be the avant-garde of global metropolitan developments (Myers, 2011; Roy and Ong, 2011) – including the governance of (in)security. Postcolonies might in fact offer ‘privileged insight into the workings of the world at large’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012: 1). This calls for an engagement with site specific modernities and ways of constructing security governance in ‘ex-centric sites’ (Bhabha, 1994: 6) in the peripheries of world society in which the Western narrative of modernity is but one among others informing people’s ways of imagining and constructing the world. Taking such a perspective seriously produces new understandings of the dynamics of peacekeeping, state-building and anti-terror interventions – which security studies often deals with as though an innocent division could be drawn between interveners and intervened, a liberal ‘us’ and another ‘them’, or as though these interventions are the only privileged sites for the globalization of security knowledge and technologies in our contemporary world. However, security interventions also take place in indirect ways. Dominant (in)security discourses constitute situations and particular actors as transnational security risk, with important repercussions for individual security. A case in point is the ‘discovery’ of diaspora communities as partners in conflict prevention in ‘developing countries’, highlighted in Laffey and Sutharan’s article in this issue with reference to the international engagement with the Tamil diaspora. Considering the above-mentioned entangled histories of (in)security governance, the analytics of postcoloniality also remind us that security practices are globalized through borrowing and emulation by local elites – be that through forced geopolitical pressures or as a result of instrumental calculation – as well as through indirect effects of hegemonic discourses and practices in transnational fields (Bilgin, 2010: 618; 2009: 340). Jacobsen’s article in this issue on the introduction of the Unique Identity Number biometrical identification system for Indian citizens, which is inseparable from globally dominant discourses on technology, knowledge and development, is illustrative in this regard. Postcoloniality pervades security knowledge and practices in all these spaces in which security governance is strongly shaped by external actors and/or transnational discourses and practice fields. However, few studies have looked into the de facto effects of these transnational influences on local (in)security governance and on the agency of those people involved and affected – both in and beyond the postcolony. Where such agency has been taken seriously, such efforts have mostly focused on the hybrid nature of the outcomes of external security interventions at the local level (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2010). By localizing the scope and effects of local agency to the local arena, such a perspective, however, downplays how ‘local’ agency and security practices may transform the transnational security field itself. While security studies has thus dealt with the transnational entanglements of (in)security governance in postcolonies and the ‘local’ repercussions of transnational security governance, much of the literature buys into the research objects, binary categories and unidirectional travelling of knowledge and institutions established in Eurocentric narratives of security governance. In the remainder of this article, we will therefore highlight three methodological moves that in our view provide the basis for overcoming these deficits and rendering security studies research more sensitive to the postcolonial condition.

#### Emerging technologies and the security governance they necessitate take shape through the universalizing drive of epistemic colonialism – the resolution is a flawed security study that imposes a linear framework of political solvency onto a chaotic world of unresolved legacies and lost futures. The ballot is a referendum on the scholarly discipline of debate – challenging the power relations of debate as an academic practice should be your ethical priority.

Adamson ’19 -- (Fiona B Adamson, 12-21-2019, "Pushing the Boundaries: Can We “Decolonize” Security Studies?," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/5/1/129/5682795, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

Is it possible to create a field of security studies that is “decolonized,” so to speak, and attuned to the multiple forms of power relations that affect everyday security practices—beyond those embedded in powerful states? In this essay, I have suggested that it is worth exploring “decolonial” perspectives as an alternative means of shedding light on dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in global security. Decolonial approaches focus on transforming structures, rather than simply diversifying them, and provide an alternative to more “problem-solving” approaches to inclusion and exclusion. The literature on decolonial theory and its application is vast, and this brief commentary has only touched on some representative arguments in a somewhat superficial manner. Nevertheless, it is worth asking to what extent incorporating principles of decoloniality could open up broader discussions on “inclusion” and “exclusion” in ways that might help transform the field. Security studies, perhaps more than any other field, has had a close link with the policy interests (and worldviews) of the most powerful. Decolonial approaches provide a means of shedding further light on this, by examining how and why the field legitimizes some voices while silencing others. A decolonial lens provides the means of excavating the history of such exclusions, by pointing to their connection with unresolved colonial, racial, and imperial histories. A number of decolonial scholars have provided practical guidance on how to promote more inclusive conversations in IR and security studies in ways that would expand who “speaks” in the discipline (see, e.g., Sabaratnam 2011). Yet, decolonial approaches have also been criticized for the way they can also reproduce the very colonial categories and hierarchies that they challenge, rather than move beyond them (Murray 2019). This has led some to connect decolonial approaches with the need to move to a more planetary form of politics and collective solidarity, in which the underlying logic is one of entanglement, interdependence, and dialogue, rather than binary forms of inclusion and exclusion (Stengers 2010; Burke et al. 2016; Conway 2019). Such strategies may be increasingly necessary under rapidly changing conditions of technological change and planetary environmental destruction. For example, the rise of big data and the increased role that algorithms play in shaping the lifeworlds of individuals lead to a type of universal “colonization” of life by technology in ways that decolonial approaches can help to shed light on.3 Similarly, the notion of the Anthropocene can be seen as being characterized by the colonization of nature by humans, in ways that actively exclude and threaten the security of many of the nonhuman inhabitants of the planet. Clearly, there is still a long way to go in the task of theorizing dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in global security studies. This special issue, however, has made an important step forward in raising the question, and in bringing to the fore cases that address issues of gender, religion, national identity, and refugees. The question the special issue ultimately leaves us with is: What other forms of exclusion may we still be blind to, and how can we begin the process of excavating and addressing them?

#### The methodology of normative debate is a chronopolitical process of linearization that erases colonized historical entanglements and traps indigenous subjects in an affective time warp – a dissection of the resolution is necessary.

Dernikos and Thiel ‘19 (Dr. Bessie P. Dernikos, Assistant Professor, joined the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in Florida Atlantic University’s College of Education in August 2015. She teaches courses in reading and language arts. Dr. Dernikos brings her experience and expertise in literacy education to the Department of Teaching and Learning. She has previously developed curricula and syllabi to introduce pre– and in-service teachers to educational theory, reading and writing development, practitioner research, curriculum design and assessment-based literacy instruction. Jaye Johnson Thiel, PhD. University of Alabama; 11 December 2019, “Literacy learning as cruelly optimistic: recovering possible lost futures through transmedial storytelling,” https://doi.org/10.1111/lit.12207; accessed 7/2/2022) ng

While the research on reader response has accounted for the ways that colonial histories shape the present, there has been, to date, little exploration of the ways that reading practices can, at times, keep us stuck in an affective time warp – that is, how the past continually merges with the present and future in potentially threatening ways. We are especially interested in how transmedial storytelling might function as a relational and ethical process of disruption in order to make visible that which “cannot be easily seen in the conventional methodological sense” (Blackman, 2019, p. 18). As such, we explore literacies/reader responses as a queer form of storytelling and time-travel: “not queer as in strange, but queer as undoing, queer as ‘trans/ formation’” (p. 247). Using the postqualitative approach of thinking with theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012), we think with theories of affect – specifically, cruel optimism (Berlant, 2011) alongside transmediality (Blackman, 2019, p. 23) – as methodological and analytical tools. Thinking with theory is an embodied engagement that calls on researchers to read data through particular theoretical lenses. While difficult to capture with words (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012), this process involves “poring over the data, annotating, describing, linking, bringing theory to bear, recalling what others have written and seeing things from different angles” (MacLure, 2013, p. 174). Rather than treating data here as a still object to code, dissect and examine for conclusive patterns, we see it as agential matter that calls forth new and different possibilities. In other words, the ongoing and open-endedness of thinking with data/theory open us up to multiple ways of engaging with literacy learning and instruction, as well as different times and spaces. Less concerned, then, with representational fidelity (Dernikos, 2018; Niccolini, 2016), we position transmedial storytelling as a radical politics that invites us to consider moments within educational spaces as affective “scenes of entanglement”: “disjointed, emotional, bent and other wordly” (Blackman, 2019, p. 57) scenes that serve to highlight the “normalised” fantasies we have created in terms of who counts as literate and what counts as proper aesthetic responses to text which, in turn, become enmeshed with what counts as proper personhood. According to Blackman (2019), science is a “storytelling machine” with the propensity to “sanitise, excise or even exorcise narratives, actors, agents and entities” (p. 41). This machine furthers a dominant narrative that not only decontextualises time and space, but also affectively circulates to re/produce student bodies in myriad ways, for example, as “struggling,” “unsuccessful” and even learning “disabled” (see e.g. Dernikos, 2018; Souto-Manning, Dernikos, and Yu, 2016). As a larger destructive force, it has the potential to violently impact our capacity to read, write, think, imagine and respond otherwise, thereby closing off other ways of knowing, being and doing. Yet, as Blackman argues, there is always more than one story being told at a time, as any narrative is “multiplatform” (p. 19): It does not exist in one place, is distributed across time and space and is enacted by multiple agents, actors, agencies, entities and objects … the history of storytelling is one that is transmedial … .transmedial storytelling is a form of storytelling that sets in motion fugitive and fossilised times and that allows new visibilities to be shaped …(pp. 22, 51) Through transmedial storytelling, we seek to unearth the dominant stories that are often held as truths so as to create moments of possibilities, or different narratives, that “enliven rather than report, to render rather than represent, to resonate rather than validate, to rupture and reimagine rather than to faithfully describe” (Vannini, 2015, p. 15). In this way, we think with data/theories of affect as “scenes of entanglement” (Blackman, 2019, p. 23) so as to reimagine standardised understandings and taken for granted notions of what it means to be successfully literate. The data that we explore here derived from a larger 6-month post/ qualitative study examining the affective encounters that impacted the making of first grade students as “un/successful” readers (see Dernikos, 2015, 2018). As we share these scenes of entanglement, we offer a glimpse of two young people who are considered “good” readers and explore the affective potentialities that social, political and economic forces unknowingly impose on their reading lives.

#### In this debate, past, present, and future are one – a continuum of violence calls for a continuum of resistance.

#### Thus we affirm a process of rememory––an anti-colonial analysis of time that disrupts the linearity and universality of Western thought and calls upon the silent yet enduring realities of colonization.

Viviane Saleh-**Hanna** 20**15**, “Black Feminist Hauntology”, Champ pénal/Penal field [Online], Vol. XII, Online since 17 February 2016, connection on 13 July 2022. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ champpenal/9168 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/champpenal.9168]//sheima

III. Rememory and Willed Forgetfulness: Resisting White Supremacy’s Vision of Life and Death 16 In Beloved, Toni Morrison (1987) presents ‘rememory’ as structural remembrance transcending individual or time-segregated acts of remembrance. Reflecting on her experiences of enslavement Sethe explains: It’s so hard for me to believe in it [time]. Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory…But it’s not… places are still there. If a house burns down, it’s gone, but the place the picture of it – stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world (ibid., 35-36, emphasis added). In rewriting our conceptions of memory into rememory Morrison invokes the intergenerational nature of structural violence, speaking to institutional and intergenerational memory held within the bodies of enslaved Africans, European slaveholders, settler-colonists and their descendants. When Orlando Patterson (1982, 175) declared racial thinking constructs race upon the assumption of innate differences based on real or imagined physical or other differences he inspired us to consider how constructions of difference between races produces a likeness necessitating homogeneity within racial categories, giving rise to the stereotyping of Blackness imagined by White culture. That homogeneity of the stereotype is a repeating and ghosted process whereby White rememory articulates across time the violent constructions of Blackness implanted by their slaveholding and colonizing ancestors.¶ Flipping the oppressive nature of this process Stuart Hall’s (1996, 211) construction of Black cultural identity asserts our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as ‘one people’ with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning beneath the shifting divisions of vicissitudes of our actual history… This ‘oneness’, underlying all the other, more superficial differences, is the truth, the essence, of ‘Caribbeaness’. What he terms ‘Caribbeaness’ can be applied to a larger Diasporic Blackness born out of a place of surviving displacement alongside and because of Diasporic Whiteness born out of a place of imagined entitlement and militarized hetero-patriarchal racism. At the root is a system of terror trapping colonized and enslaved peoples within cycles of abusive relationships structured upon racism – a masculinized, heteronormative, classist system of control of the global majority so that a minority White community can achieve abusive, parasitic prosperity. What involuntarily binds us together are the institutionalized, thus wide-reaching and repetitive praxis of colonial violence. Through both the processes of colonizing or being colonized we emerge – with very different relationships to history and systems – a people haunted by racial colonialism and promises broken, submerged in what Black Feminist termed willed forgetfulness, a process whereby the colossal injustice in the settlement of the West has been successfully repressed by settler culture. Willed forgetfulness has been foundational to my conceptions of Black Feminist Hauntology as it opens a window to envision and articulate the overbearing silence – reimagined as enforced or willed forgetfulness surrounding colonial violence and its racializing ways. Willed forgetfulness is rooted within dominant colonizing cultures and thus impacts all that live within them: …and suddenly there was Sweet Home [plantation] rolling, rolling, rolling, rolling out before her in shameless beauty. It never looked as terrible as it was and it made her wonder if hell was a pretty place too. Fire and brimstone all right, but hidden in lacy groves. Boys hanging from the most beautiful sycamores in the world. It shamed her – remembering the wonderful soughing trees rather than the boys. Try as she might to make it otherwise, the sycamores beat out the children every time and she could not forgive her memory for that (Morrison, 1987, 6). ¶ The impact of willed forgetfulness manifests itself through Sethe’s memory in manners that move her beyond will and into a coerced place of conquest. These conceptions of memory, renamed rememory take on new dimensions beyond the mind, now residing in repeated (institutionalizing) actions ‘out there’ beyond each individual. Rememory is preserved in institutions, branded upon their violently structured bureaucracies and practiced upon the bodies of the colonized by the bodies of colonizers: a specter is haunting modernity – the specter of colonialism. It is from outside our own decisionmaking reaches, a dichotomized notion of remembrance versus forgetfulness, that rememory’s haunted manners formed my imaginings of Black Feminist Hauntology IV. What is a Sociological Ghost? Is She a Black Feminist? 20 Black Feminist Hauntology is an anti-colonial analysis of time that captures the expanding and repetitive nature of structural violence, a process whereby we begin to locate a language to speak about the actual, not just symbolic or theorized violence that is racial colonialism. The ghosted nature of this work brings forth or calls upon the silent yet visible and enduring realities of colonialism:¶ …a ‘sociological ghost,’ the form by which something is lost, barely visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-trained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us, in its own way, of course. The way of the ghost is haunting, and haunting is a very particular way of knowing what has happened or is happening. Being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition… the forces in our lives that we usually try to ignore or forget, but never totally leave us alone. If we deliberately investigate these ghosts, though, we can learn to take control over troubling memories; we may turn destructive haunting into something more enabling (Jacobs, 2007, 7). Here, the term ‘ghost’ neither confirms nor denies the metaphysical. It simply invokes a framework in which terror and unpredictability, grief and unrest, guilt and injustice, ancestors and demons can be called upon to empower and liberate us, not from the fact that we have been violated or even that violation continues, but from a condition of inability to locate the heart and soul of the problem.

#### Reject the techno-liberal dream of the resolution -- we shift our gaze to the past, take refuge in forgotten narratives, venture into the affective terrain of the unknown and the unseen, in order to create decolonial futures.

Dernikos and Thiel 19 (Dr. Bessie P. Dernikos, Assistant Professor, joined the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in Florida Atlantic University’s College of Education in August 2015. She teaches courses in reading and language arts. Dr. Dernikos brings her experience and expertise in literacy education to the Department of Teaching and Learning. She has previously developed curricula and syllabi to introduce pre– and in-service teachers to educational theory, reading and writing development, practitioner research, curriculum design and assessment-based literacy instruction. Jaye Johnson Thiel, PhD. University of Alabama; 11 December 2019, “Literacy learning as cruelly optimistic: recovering possible lost futures through transmedial storytelling,” https://doi.org/10.1111/lit.12207; accessed 7/2/2022) ng

Since most of us have been conditioned to think of literacy as “power,” a “state of grace”, or a necessary skill needed to function in the modern world (Scribner, 1984, p.8), it might seem odd to think about literacy as a problematic object of attachment – as cruelly optimistic. Yet here we are. It is clear in the case of both Carl and Beth that being a “good” reader comes with fraught decisions and the ability to navigate relations of attachment that are either “impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (Berlant, 2011, p. 24). Take reading standards. They are supposed to be helpful, fill in gaps and open a world of possibilities, but for both Carl and Beth –both considered “good” readers– these standards produced something else, something cruel. According to Ahmed (2011), forces mold and shape us, where any given moment can be impressive and/ or oppressive. But interestingly enough, this pressing – in whatever form it takes – is often meant as good will. Perhaps this is what is most cruel (Berlant, 2006) about mainstream literacy policies/practices and national efforts to standardise literacy education – they are actually meant to help students, like Carl and Beth, achieve the dream of a “good” or “better life” (Jones and Vagle, 2013). However, this promise will never be achieved if we ignore the precarities of the past: The aftermath of colonialism and the ways our reading practices are shaped in relation to other times, spaces, people and places (Sharpe, 2016). As literacy educators and researchers committed to other ways of knowing/being/doing, transmedial storytelling helps us to mediate “possible (lost) futures in the present” (Blackman, 2019, p. 53). Mediating disrupts the rigid normativity of dominant stories that keep us affectively stuck in time(s). That said, our intent here is not to forward a prescriptive approach to literacy, as we imagine engaging in transmedial storytelling involves zigzagging unknowable pedagogical terrain, thereby opening up multiple possibilities for practice and for bodies read as un/successful. We would, nevertheless, like to offer the following questions as provocations for educators to consider so that things might be otherwise (see also Dernikos, 2018; Thiel and Kuby, 2019): • In what ways do affective forces (social, political, economic, racial, gendered, etc.) shape and re/orient pedagogical acts? • What hidden histories are lodged in the present to make certain identities im/possible for students, both as literacy learners and human beings?3 • What do certain literacy pedagogies produce? Who do they serve – at what cost and to whom? • How can transmedial storytelling guide curricular choices –e.g. by inviting educators to expand their idea of the classics (see also Dernikos, 2018; McNair, 2010) so as to embrace literature written by and about people from varied racial and ethnic backgrounds?4 • How else might literacy and teaching be practiced if we remember literacy as affective time-traveling? Questions like these provide small openings for displaced, devalued and/or simply forgotten narratives and possibilities to unfold. Attending to affect, then, reminds us that matter is not only lively but also historical; this historicity makes time-travel possible by displacing the binary logic that strictly separates the past, present and future. In other words, transmedial storytelling “sets in motion fugitive and fossilised times … that allow[s] new visibilities to be shaped” (p. 51) and offers different insights into literacy practices. As Beth’s scene of entanglement teaches us, engaging in critical literacy practices by simply introducing a book with diverse characters is not enough. We must also address the larger affective forces (e.g. social, historical, political and economic) that shape children’s interpretative responses to literature in both expected and unexpected ways. Ultimately, attachments to happy objects such as fairytales often operated to compromise Ms. Rizzo’s students, while at the same time, promising to help them become successfully literate bodies who can have “the good life” if they just follow the rules. But for Carl, Beth and other young people in this first grade classroom, learning to read was, in large part, tied to Core Knowledge read alouds and the kinds of information that presumably made for a “culturally literate” somebody: a subject aligned with a “White [middle class] and heterosexually normative narrative of the world” (Muñoz, 2000, p. 75). The problem is, as Carl suggested, that this narrative of the world is in direct opposition to the social worlds these young children lived and breathed. The hope, then, or promise of a happier “better life” inevitably begins to crumble as happy objects cling to other relational forces (e.g., gender, sexuality, race and heteronormativity) that work to limit capacities to think and feel differently – to move throughout the social in cruelly optimistic ways. We call on educators to recognise that standardised literacy policies (such as Common Core), practices and pedagogies often cruelly privilege colonial histories and dominant narratives circulating within classroom spaces – impacting students in ways we may not even be aware. Transmedial storytelling offers possibilities to not only notice but also unsettle these histories and narratives. And while histories cannot be erased, futures are yet to be written.

#### Debate is a site of historiography – the topic is not a statement of objective linearity but rather a myriad of competing and collective histories, a subjective construction of embodied knowledge and experience – the 1AC shifts the pedagogical paradigm within this debate towards the practice of insurgent subaltern thought that disrupts Western chronopolitical narratives.

Kempf ’06 -- assistant professor, Teaching Stream, in the Department of Curriculum, Teaching and Learning, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE/UT). He is Coordinator of Secondary Education for OISE/UT’s Master of Teaching in Elementary and Secondary Education Graduate Program. (Arlo Kempf, 1-1-2006, "Anti-Colonial Historiography: Interrogating Colonial Education," Anti-Colonialism and Education, pp. 129-158, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789087901110\_008, accessed 7-2-2022) -- nikki

The writing of history has long been a privileged calling undertaken within the church, royal court, landed estate, affluent town house, government agency, university and corporate funded foundation. Michael Parenti (2003, p. 13) History is alive. It is neither static nor fixed. History is the subjective construction of what and how, people and groups remember. It is the totality of lived experience. While often perceived as an immovable sort of record, history is better understood as a site of struggle. There is strategic importance in the who, why, where and how of knowledge production. The struggle is that of a prolonged interrogation of competing versions of events, as well as the power relations implicit in those versions. This paper is an attempt to begin, inspire and facilitate an interrogation of dominant history. Included below is, first, a theoretical framework for anti-colonial historiography. Second, an analytical case study of the history textbooks used in Ontario, Canada, from 1866 to 2006. And third, a case specific example of curricular synthesis, demonstrating one way in which dominant education can be subverted. Upon beginning this piece, I unconsciously presumed I had license to write about whatever I pleased. Sadly, this ignorance is the inbred sense of entitlement of the White (usual male) scholar. As I worked through the project, I came to better understand the responsibility of all writers and researchers to never presume inclusion or entitlement when approaching a topic or community. I am a White teacher in Ontario. I have been asked as well as required, to teach a colonizer’s history. I was educated in Ontario – inundated with the tautology of Canada’s multiculturalism while taught the glories of only certain peoples’ ideas, struggles, epistemologies and ontological perspectives. Further, my child, as I write this, sits in an Ontario classroom with (in the Toronto District Schools Board’s tribute to empire) a picture of England’s queen, always in view. My people and my society have cultured within me a racism and a comfort with White supremacy. The racism is a quiet one, understood best not through my words or actions – for I have long spoken anti-racism – but through the instincts and reactions that I have come to interrogate and have attempted to change in the last half of my life. It is understood through my ignorance – meaning I rarely know the little pieces are there, until they are gone. One result is that I must G.J.S. Dei and A. Kempf (eds.), Anti-Colonialism and Education: The Politics of Resistance, 129–158. © 2006. Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. KEMPF continue to look at myself and my contextual underpinnings, with a critical eye. This process does not end with the completion of one paper, book or coversation. It is something with and through which I must work for as long as inequity is configured in its current state. To contest dominant history is for me a professional, personal, academic and family undertaking. It affects and has meaning in all parts of my life – be it playing “castle” with my daughter, or designing courses that subvert the dominant curricula for my classes. This for me is not a solitary pursuit. History is not mine to find or document: it is a conversation in which I may, at times, participate. One of my responsibilities as a White person within a White supremacist society is to recognize and respect the places and pursuits best left alone by the dominant. This is not to say that Whites have no role in the anti-colonial struggle, but rather that those roles are often best assigned and designed by the oppressed. It is relevant here to make a distinction between being White (as a subject location and site of difference) and Whiteness (as a system of privilege) (see Ruttenberg, 1993). Such distinctions must not obfuscate the role all White people play in White supremacy – be it often or rare, intentional or unintentional. With this said, White people have a crucial role to play in contesting White privilege. Production and reproduction of knowledge are ideally, collective pursuits, which recognize and work to dissolve power inequities – pedagogically and epistemologically. This work is thus not prescriptive, but interrogative. It aims to support an anti-colonial project, theoretically and practically, by providing both a framework and examples for and of, anti-colonial historiography. The anti-colonial framework casts a critical gaze wherever imposition occurs. It rejects the etymological implication of the “post” in post-colonialism and asserts that the colonial encounter is trans-historical rather than historical – it persists in colonized and colonizing nations. As far as education, we may look to the myriad ways that difference is ignored, suppressed or taken up in classrooms and curricula. It is not only under the tutelage of invading colonizing regimes that people find themselves excluded from the format and content of their education. The anti-colonial stance posits that not only are indigenous people made foreigners in their own lands by way of the colonial encounter, but also that immigrants and racialized minorities are similarly excluded from/by dominant pedagogical practices. The international socio-political processes of displacement, impoverishment and migration (forced and voluntary) are thus relevant here. So when analyzing colonialism in the contemporary context, we must relate the legacy of Spanish colonialism in Mexico, to the lives of Mexicans fighting for health care in California and Texas. When looking at the legacy of French imperialism in Africa, we must look at the struggle for representation by North Africans in Southern France. How do the educational practices in these regions (the US and France, as well as Mexico and Northern Africa) reflect power and competing histories in these multifaceted colonial encounters? These are but two examples, not of a new colonialism, but of the internationalization and extension of colonialism. This can be understood as one very important aspect of globalization/imperialism. In the Canadian context, imposition is thus understood not simply as it affects the indigenous people who continue to fight for autonomy under the yolk of Canadian colonialism, but as it affects all those marginalized by the content and contexts of schooling. Anti-colonial education interrogates the Euro-American/Canadian lens and philosophy through which such practices are developed and invoked. Those who teach history do not simply convey knowledge, but go much further and construct it through conscious and unconscious inclusion and exclusion of historical perspectives, contributions and events. To teach history well is to question and teach questioning, at every turn. A critical approach to teaching and learning cannot be taken up merely for the sake of being critical. Our questioning should be both strategic and compassionate. The history instructor should not only address historical events, but also the history of how events in question have been taught hitherto. Historical events exist in transhistorical contexts and can have transhistorical relevance. An awareness of these contexts is crucial to understanding (a) regional power discrepancies, as Said (1993) argues, and (b) local power inequities and inequalities current and historical. History is a responsibility; an imperfect pursuit with specific interests and intentions in play at every turn. Zinn writes: My argument cannot be against selection, simplification, emphasis, which are inevitable for both cartographers and historians. . . . [T]he mapmaker’s distortion is a technical necessity for a common purpose shared by all people who need maps. The historian’s distortion is more than technical, it is ideological; it is released into a world of contending interests, where any chosen emphasis supports (whether the historian means to or not) some kind of interest, whether economic or political or racial or national or sexual. (1999, p. 8) The error we must avoid in the telling and teaching of history is thus not subjectivity, but the denial thereof. To claim that any perspective is complete and/or neutral, is erroneous. To claim that history is told or taught without specific objectives (conscious or unconscious) is inaccurate. We must then acknowledge the purpose and perspective of our teaching and telling of history – we must identify the subjectivities at play in the narratives we convey, lest we fall prey to the Eurocentric claim of objectivity and its corresponding mask of universality. Formal curricula, at all levels of study (elementary, high school and college/university) serve to construct meaning for students as far as self-identification, cultural belonging and school engagement. History, with its philological, cultural, economic, geographic, political and social strands is perhaps unique among so-called “disciplines” in that the implications for the learner are so broad. In the case of popular representations of Aboriginal Peoples and perspectives in dominant Canadian history, not only are the people and perspectives largely absent, but so too is the story of the attempted genocide of the People of Turtle Island and their history. A reconsideration of such history is thus not only a strategic examination, but also one that quite simply, seeks greater accuracy and thoroughness in order to combat the removal of so much from the history of Turtle Island.1 Historical analyses and the creation of the “other”, either as backward or as outside of history, are present throughout colonized and colonizing societies currently and historically. The dominant has for centuries, written the dominated out 131 KEMPF of the historical material process. The works of leading European thinkers (like Bacon, Descartes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Smith, Ricardo and others) from a variety of fields (such as politics, mathematics, science, philosophy, economics and others) serve as a modern foundation and prescription for othering non-dominant knowledges and peoples (see Shiva, 1997; Wolff, 2000; Bishop, 1990; Joseph, 1987; and others). The effects of such thinkers are present in educational practises in almost all colonial contexts. Educational imperialism is a crucial element of colonialism, with profound effects on the colonized and colonizer. Fanon writes: . . . [C]olonialism is not content to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated country. Colonialism is not satisfied with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of devaluing colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today. (1963, p. 210). Fanon’s work speaks to the mental effects of colonialism and colonial education. The uni-focal history of dominant/colonial education serves to amputate marginalized people from their past and consequently from their present. In Canada today, the histories of Aboriginal people are excluded from dominant education. Spivak’s (1996) work with community groups and scholars on the historiography of the Subaltern in India, is a relevant example not only of historical interrogation, but of the creation of a revised popular history. The subaltern can be loosely understood in the Gramscian sense as comprised by “non-elite or subordinated social groups” (Landry and MacLean, 1996, p. 203). The knowledge and practices of these groups are understood for the purposes of an anti-colonial historiography, as relevant in and of themselves, as well as informative for positive (action-oriented) social change. The anti-colonial critique must be pointed at all thinkers and philosophies, on the left and the right. Two hundred years ago, even revolutionary European thinkers partook of the oppressive practice of “othering”. In the Introduction to A Critique of Political Economy, Marx writes: “Tribes living exclusively on hunting or fishing are beyond the boundary line from which real [historical] development begins” (from Eze, 2000, p. 234). The telling, or omission, of the history of the colonized by the colonizer, is part of the reproduction and preservation of what Eze calls the “neocolonial setup” (2000, p. 242). He writes: They speak of the colonized or of the subjects of neocolonial exploitation in biological terms and declare them to be the antagonists of history. The native, or the neocolonial peasantry is said to be inferior and have no appreciation of values . . . Thus the settler, or neocolonial elite, has no regrets or qualms of conscience for he does violence not to humans but to strange entities located between humanity and undifferentiated history. (2000, p. 242) When students see neither themselves nor their histories reflected in their education, disengagement understandably follows. In Decolonizing Methodologies, Smith writes: “Schooling is directly implicated in this process. Through the curriculum and its underlying theories of knowledge, early schools redefined the world and where indigenous people were positioned within the world” (1991, p. 33). In many cases, Aboriginal people have been located outside of the world: the world of progress, the world of goodness, the world of history. In the capitalist epoch, history decidedly begins and ends with capitalism. For orthodox Marxists, history begins and ends with class struggle. Cabral says in a 1966 speech: [T]his leads us to pose the following question: does history begin only with the development of the phenomenon of ‘class’, and consequently of class struggle? To answer in the affirmative would be to place outside history the whole period of life of human groups from the discovery of hunting, and later of nomadic and sedentary agriculture, to the organization of herds and the private appropriation of land. It would also be to consider . . . that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America were living outside of history. (1969, p. 77) Although Cabral is speaking in the African context almost forty years ago, his words are true today in many colonial settings and speak to the global nature of the oppression implicit in so much colonial pedagogy – currently and historically. The education system in Ontario, Canada for example, ignores the content and practice of Aboriginal history and epistemology. It instead provides compulsory Canadian settler history that preserves the salience of settler domination. Inaccurate and oppressive histories are thus thrust upon Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Peoples alike. Edward Said (1997) argues that although Marx was sympathetic to non-EuroAmerican peoples suffering under the yolk of European imperialism, he saw the suffering as the beginning of the reorientation of a backward society, toward the possibility of a better future. Marx was concerned with oppressed people but was guilty of the paternalistic western discursive position that “they” need civilising, if only on an economic level, by “us”. Marx was content to form his understanding of the non-European Subaltern from problematic symbols of Orientalism, created and maintained by the dominant political project; a project which Marx himself purported to reject (Said, 1997). Said quotes Marx and his racist conclusion about Asian Peoples, “they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (1997, p. 93). Marx falls into the trap of essentializing the non-dominant world by assigning a false homogeneity to all of its peoples. Aboriginal Peoples struggle against not only a western view of history, but also against a western presentation of history, which ignores among other things, oral histories and the value of story telling (Smith, 1991). A failure to contest this approach allows for the continued amputation of people from their cultures and histories. Fanon writes: Every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its cultural originality – finds itself face to face . . . with the culture of the [dominant] mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards. (1967, p. 18) Fanon’s analyses are as relevant today in colonial educational settings globally, as they were to the Caribbean and Africa (about which he was writing) in 1967. As many authors have argued, a multicentric approach to knowledge and learning is possible and I would add necessary, in a number of different contexts (see Agrawal, 1995; Yakubu, 1994; Dei, 2000; Hodson, 1998). Similarly, a number of applications of this knowledge are possible. It is necessary then, that teachers operate pedagogically only on a multicentric understanding and articulation of principles, strategies and goals. This multi-focal approach can contribute to what Dei has called a “complete history of ideas which have shaped and continue to shape human growth and development” (2000, p. 17). Raising these issues in the Canadian context sheds light on broader questions of knowledge production, the validation and dissemination of information, and roles of power and representation in education. Canada’s failure to teach and value accurate and inclusive history must not be understood as benign omission, but rather as part of its ongoing colonial project in which the power of representation is paramount. Anticolonial historiography differs from typical historical re-telling in that it takes an overtly strategic approach to the telling of things past. Its focus is two pronged, working to interrogate and rupture dominant history on one hand, while focusing on the achievements, practices and resistance of oppressed peoples to colonial imposition on the other. It is not the existence of a political project within anticolonial historiography that distinguishes it from mainstream history, but rather its unabashed articulation of its political aims from the start. This does not mean that we should dispense with accuracy as a goal or direction for study. It means that we must contextualize the telling of history as well as history itself so the why, who, where and how of knowledge production are brought into focus. Objectivity is better sought through an interrogation of subjectivities than through a denial that such competing perspectives exist. In Discourse on Colonialism, Césairé (1972) problematizes the subversive notion of history as a monologue. I argue here that history must be a dialogue – a continually evolving contestation of perspectives, versions and memories. History must move beyond the notion of fractious divisions of time into past, present and future. In place of such a partition, a continuum of knowledge must be fostered wherein knowing itself is understood as embodied as well as temporal, and both as an individual and communal path and practice, which identifies and values the subjectivities of learners. The aim here is not a post-structuralist one, wherein all perspectives are valued equally, but one in which light can be shed on all experiences to reveal the bad and celebrate the good; one in which invalid histories are exposed as such. On an individual level this can assist in the development of what Freire has called “complete humanism” (1997, p. 25). On a community level, it can help to facilitate the empowerment of marginalized groups.

# 2AC

## 2AC -- Case

### 2AC -- OV

## 2AC -- FW

### 2AC -- FW -- C/I

#### Counter-interpretation – affirmatives must defend an epistemic or political trajectory in response to the resolution as an archive of violence. This views the resolution as a jumping off point rather than an endpoint and includes strategies of historical storytelling as well as political reformism. We meet the interpretation – our affirmation of rememory forces a confrontation with the catastrophe of African colonialism and subverts white technologies of erasure that operate through the solution oriented politics of normative debate.

#### Prefer our interpretation --

#### 1 -- Ethical Correction DA -- The entirety of the 1AC was an impact turn to rehearsing the grammars of the resolution – if we win our aff we win that this resolution is a flawed starting point for debate and that only an interpretation that includes corrective ethical filters on the resolution can solve

#### 2 -- Linear Progressivism DA -- the discourse of racial progress is dependent on the erasure of instances of trauma and violence that sit outside the normative historical record – their framework envisions time as a linear trajectory in which this debate is the next iteration.

Winters ’16 -- Joseph Winters is the Alexander F. Hehmeyer Associate Professor of Religious Studies and African and African American Studies. He also holds secondary positions in English and Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies. His interests lie at the intersection of black religious thought, African-American literature, and critical theory (Joseph R. Winters, 2016, “Hope Draped in Black: Race Melancholy, and the Agony of Progress”, Duke University Press, ISBN: 978-0-8223-6173-2, accessed 6-29-2021) -- nikki

As I show especially in chapter 5, American exceptionalism, progress, and empire form a complicated and tortuous constellation, a constellation that has been both formative and destructive of black existence. Americanstyle optimism in a future marked by greater opportunity and freedom for American citizens (and nations that endorse the nation’s ideals and principles) is intertwined with the assumption that America is an exceptional nation, a “beacon” to the rest of the world. In his influential book The American Jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch traces American exceptionalism back to the Puritan-inspired notion that America represents a New Israel, a nation and people that have been chosen by God to redeem the world.29 The imagined covenant between God and America ensures that the nation’s future is one of plenitude on the condition that America strives to fulfill its mission to the other nations, a mission that entails the expansion of internal and external borders. One example of this missionary attitude is President McKinley’s proposal to civilize and Christianize America’s “little brown brothers” in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century, a proposal that justified America’s occupation of the Philippines. According to Bercovitch, as civic rituals and discourses perpetually reenact the idea of chosenness (in religious and secular garb), America increasingly becomes a symbol of progress, freedom, and opportunity.30 He claims that prominent American writers and critics, including figures of the nineteenth century like Emerson and Whitman, often ascribe these ideals to America as if they are part of its essence, part of its fundamental makeup. America, in fact, has privileged access to these ideals; the world’s success depends on America’s capacity to embody and spread the spirit of democracy. On Bercovitch’s reading, American progress constitutes a unifying and unidirectional trajectory; progress, as he points out, “denies divisiveness.”31 While Ellison seems to have one foot in this all-too-familiar ideal of America and the grammar of progress and optimism that accompanies this ideal, he also pushes back against this framework. He contends that progressive and triumphant narratives rely on the denial of painful and uncomfortable details of the nation’s history. As he puts it, “A great part of our optimism, like our progress, has been bought at the cost of ignoring the [troublesome] processes through which we’ve arrived at any given moment in our national existence.”32 Ellison acknowledges that there is something about our attachment to American-style progress that diminishes our capacity to remember and contemplate the tragic underside of this movement and story. As Du Bois and Ellison indicate, progressive accounts of history have been complicit with the violence of modern life. These narratives work to rationalize the violence enacted against “less advanced” groups, people who need to be civilized, saved, or brought into the fold of universal history. Similarly, they encourage people to forget, deny, or downplay the violence that happens against people of color in the name of progress. As I show throughout this book, these concerns about the dangers and erasures of progress resonate with the reflections of Walter Benjamin, the literary critic of the twentieth century who is often associated with the Frankfurt School. In his well-known essay “On the Concept of History,” Benjamin acknowledges that progress is a “storm,” that this idea has justified and been complicit with numerous historical catastrophes.33 But just as important for my argument, he suggests that progressive narratives vitiate our ability to remember, contemplate, cite, and mourn these catastrophes. For Benjamin, progress renders history coherent and harmonious by resolving the traumatic dimensions of history, by incorporating history’s traumas into affirmative accounts that underwrite the positions of those in power. As he puts it, memory is always in danger of “becoming a tool of the ruling classes,” a situation that threatens to “murder the dead twice,” to erase and eliminate the dissonant quality of past suffering, injustice, struggle, and loss.34 Think, for instance, of the way Obama’s presidency is often placed in a linear trajectory that begins with chattel slavery, travels through Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation, traverses the civil rights movement, and culminates with Obama’s election.35 This kind of story places black American struggles into a transparent, forward-marching story that easily makes sense of and resolves past and present traumas and conflicts. In other words, we don’t have to be disturbed by this ponderous racial past because it has been lifted away, or is being lifted away, by the achievements of the present. As McCain’s speech shows us, Obama’s victory might invoke the memory of racial suffering but this dissonant memory is quickly superseded by an optimistic interpretation of this historic moment that reassures us of American progress and supremacy. The “triumphs” of the present enable us to explain away and buffer ourselves from the unsettling quality of America’s racial history. Similarly, overconfident claims about black American advancement and racial progress assume that these achievements have been distributed equally across class and gender lines. This overconfidence screens from view the ways racial fears and anxieties, traditionally directed toward black subjects, can get redirected and attached to other bodies and communities that seemingly pose a threat to the nation’s well-being and collective images. But, as Du Bois and Ellison also demonstrate, it is not easy to simply dismiss the idea of progress in light of the multiple and conflicting ways that this trope has been used, especially in the context of black freedom struggles. I acknowledge that a basic notion of progress has inspired many struggles, acts of resistance, and movements that many of us admire. It is a concept that has been deployed, resignified, and enacted by communities and individuals that have experienced the underside of this concept and process. I think, for instance, of Martin Luther King’s faith in a universe that “bends toward justice.” I also am reminded of Theodor Adorno’s claim that progress provides a preliminary “answer to the doubt and the hope that things will finally get better, that people will at least be able to breathe a sigh of relief.”36 What would critique, resistance, or political struggle mean apart from a minimal notion of progress, a hope that the quality of life will improve, especially for those groups that have been systematically marginalized? I therefore acknowledge that progress, a trope that facilitates certain ways of interpreting, constructing, and relating to historical change and development, has had diferent meanings and connotations. (To claim, for instance, that humanity necessarily moves forward, improves, and approaches a state of fulfillment is not necessarily the same thing as claiming that progress is the result of contingent human efforts, interventions, and interactions.) I also take it that this idea is intertwined with other fraught ideas and ideals that many people cherish— freedom, equality, inclusion, recognition, reconciliation, agency, and so forth. Although I take seriously the complexities involved with this category, in what follows I am primarily concerned with progress as a triumphant category, as a tool that helps to reinforce, affirm, and justify the order of things (and conceal the nasty aspects of the existing state of affairs). In other words, this book specifically targets narratives, images, and strategies that rely on the denial or easy resolution of painful tensions and contradictions in the past and present, those facets of life that remind us that the status quo is harsh and cruel for many people under its sway. While attachments to progress are not always explicit, my sense is that it lurks behind and discloses itself in collective commitments to American exceptionalism, the American Dream, a postracial society, leaving the past behind, and spreading democracy and capitalism, even through war, to less “developed” nations. For many people, catastrophic events in the modern age, like the Holocaust, the slow extermination of Native Americans, The Middle Passage, genocide in Rwanda, and perpetual wars and ecological disasters, have shattered the notion that history necessarily moves toward a more complete and fulfilling state. At the same time, this idea of progress episodically flashes up. It operates in both subtle and explicit ways to mitigate and diminish the tragic qualities of history and human existence. The denial of ongoing racial disparity and violence is, in part, a result of our culture’s yearning for a future (and a present) that has been liberated from certain kinds of unsettling losses, memories, and conflicts. If progress is the condition of the possibility of hope in our culture, then this is a hope that has little to no room for melancholy.

#### 3 -- Revolutionary Deliberation DA – the introduction of radical epistemology into debate that breaks the form of normative dialogue is good and necessary – decolonizing deliberative frameworks by engaging subaltern thought that forms alternative rationalities within the sphere of discourse – only reimagining debate outside of colonial knowledge production and procedural confines can solve

Banerjee ’21 -- Professor of Management and Associate Dean of Research & Enterprise at Bayes Business School. He was also Director of the Executive PhD program from 2013 to 2019. His primary research interests are in the areas of corporate social irresponsibility, sustainability, climate change and resistance movements. Other research interests include critical management studies, Indigenous ecology, and postcolonial studies. (Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, 10-10-2021, “Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives From Below”, Journal of Business Ethics, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

Towards a Decolonial Imaginary Scholarship on decoloniality offers a critical perspective where subaltern difference becomes the basis for decolonizing deliberative democracy involving a critical engagement with knowledges and cultural practices that were delegitimized by colonialism (Faria et al., 2010). Decoloniality recognizes the failure of the postcolonial state to live up to the promise of decolonization and ‘interrogates the postcolonial nation state as a colonizing entity in the context of struggles over Indigenous sovereignty’ (Banerjee, 2021, p.4). Emerging from Latin America, decolonial scholarship followed a different but related trajectory than postcolonial studies, which was dominated by the work of diasporic South Asian scholars trained in the English literary canons and whose inaccessible writing had little to offer to non-English speaking scholars (Misoczky, 2019). Settler colonialism in the Americas, as we have discussed earlier, differed in significant ways from the predominantly British colonialism in India, the Middle East and Africa, which was the focus of postcolonial studies (Harding, 2017). The fundamental critique of European colonialism by decolonial scholars was similar to what was articulated earlier by postcolonial scholars: the fixing of difference based on a privileged Eurocentric position, racial hierarchies, and the binary categorizations of primitive/modern, developed/underdeveloped, and civilized/barbaric. However, there is a temporal difference: while postcolonial scholarship refers mainly to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries decoloniality begins from the moment of European invasion of the Americas in the fifteenth century (Bhambra, 2014). Postcolonial scholarship’s obsession with culture and the fetishization of difference also diverted criticism of capitalism and its associated inequalities and forms of oppression, which are central to decolonial thinking (Dirlik, 1994). Latin American scholars like Aníbal Quijano, María Lugones, Gloria Anzaldúa, Maldonado-Torres and Walter Mignolo among others pioneered scholarship with a decolonial epistemic perspective that takes into account diverse worldviews, particularly of subaltern racial and ethnic populations from the Global South, to produce alternate epistemologies that transcend the Western canon. Colonial difference becomes the basis of the production of these subaltern knowledges resulting in a decolonized epistemology from the perspective of marginalized populations (Mignolo, 2000). The notion of coloniality is inextricably linked with modernity—coloniality is constitutive of modernity and hence ‘there is no modernity without coloniality and no coloniality without modernity’ (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, p. 4). This critical ‘border thinking’ (Anzaldúa, 1987) is the decolonial response to Habermas’s Eurocentric ‘unfinished project of modernity’ from the perspective of the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference (Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 26). Quijano’s (2000, 2007) concept of the coloniality of power, which constitutes the global capitalist system in liberal democracies, is central to decolonial thought. Coloniality of power reflects forms of domination that continued in democratic postcolonial countries after the end of direct colonialism, reinforcing historical structural inequalities of the colonial era (Ballestrin, 2015). Coloniality of power is based on a Eurocentric racialized classification of societies that was imposed on Latin America after European invasion: the modernity that was designed to break the shackles of the primitive past of postcolonial countries also embedded them in racial and ethnic hierarchies that constitute the international division of labor (Grosfoguel, 2007; Quijano, 2007). Feminist philosophers have extended decolonial scholarship by drawing attention to the coloniality of gender, which was neglected in initial formulations of decoloniality (Harding, 2017; Lugones, 2010; Manning, 2018). Decolonial feminism requires overturning the coloniality of gender by a critical analysis of the racialized and capitalist forms of gender oppression (Lugones, 2010). Knowledge production has generally been a one way street where theories that are produced in the ‘global North’ are imposed on the ‘global South’ (Alcadipani et al., 2012). Producers of theories, including democratic theories, have generally ignored postcolonial critiques and subaltern theories. This epistemic coloniality infects theories of democracy in two ways requiring new modes of understanding: first, there is a need to understand how coloniality in democracy produces inequality and injustice, conditions that will always hinder the democratic project. Second, democracy in coloniality requires an understanding of how democracy is used to sustain coloniality (Ballestrin, 2015). This is the essence of the decolonial project. Such a perspective can provide deeper insights into understanding why and how democracies in postcolonial countries ‘deviate’ from the norm while also understanding how the norm itself is constituted by colonial relations of power. Western powers, to protect their own interests, have exported democracy to non-European sites through soft power using international aid, trade deals, human rights regimes and cultural exchange programs, backed up by military power when these forms of persuasion fail or as Ballestrin (2015, p. 221) puts it, ‘when the platforms of democracy and human rights serve to justify contemporary imperial expansion, coloniality is imposed.’ Decoloniality is also rooted in praxis whereas much of postcolonial scholarship is preoccupied with the cultural domain. The starting point for a decolonial praxis is to imagine radically different perspectives that can dislodge Western rationality as the only basis of reality (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018). This does not mean an outright rejection of Western notions of progress, democracy and development but involves a critical reflexivity that can ‘liberate the production of knowledge, refection, and communication from the pitfalls of European rationality/modernity’ (Quijano, 2007, p. 177). Rather than lapse into fundamentalist thinking, a critique of Eurocentric modernity is a project of transmodernity (Dussel, 2012), which involves imagining multiple worlds and forms of democratic alterity as opposed to the global imposition of a single modernity and liberal form of democracy centered in Europe (Grosfoguel, 2013). Transmodern forms of democracy entails decolonizing the racial and capitalist bases of liberal democracy. This epistemological decolonization is a difficult task involving new forms of intercultural understanding that could form the basis of alternate rationalities. Merely bringing in non-Western perspectives into the canon is not sufficient—for example describing an African ‘ubuntu’ ethics in a European academic journal may qualify as an alternative moral theory but it still fails as a decolonization project because this knowledge is interpellated in Western rules of validation of knowledge and a coloniality of power (Naude, 2019). Perhaps understanding decolonial sites of dissent, resistance, and protest and the multitude of livelihood struggles arising from a politics of difference may enable us to imagine other worlds that are not defined by Eurocentric modernity (Escobar, 2004). Many of these struggles are about a praxis of living and communal organizing that is delinked from the modern capitalist nation state (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018).

#### 4 -- Colonial Realism DA -- Centering the colonial state-form of NATO as the locus of discussion cements racialized power relations as a fixture of academic dialogue and precludes generating revolutionary energy towards indigenous political praxis – framing out the sovereign state in debate is key.

Banerjee ’21 -- Professor of Management and Associate Dean of Research & Enterprise at Bayes Business School. He was also Director of the Executive PhD program from 2013 to 2019. His primary research interests are in the areas of corporate social irresponsibility, sustainability, climate change and resistance movements. Other research interests include critical management studies, Indigenous ecology, and postcolonial studies. (Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, 10-10-2021, “Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives From Below”, Journal of Business Ethics, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

Decoloniality is not the same as political decolonization that occurred during the 1800s in Latin America and the mid twentieth century in Africa and Asia when former colonies gained independence and became new nation states. The transition from colonialism to nationalism while marking a postcolonial moment for the nation state excluded large segments of its populations who were now governed by the same rationality and coloniality of knowledge that inscribed the colonial project. Recognition of ethnic minorities among postcolonial nations does not challenge existing power relations or the dominant state model of development. For instance, while the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples guaranteed their economic, cultural and religious rights and the right to strengthen their social and political institutions, it not clear how Indigenous peoples can actually exercise these rights, because as Article 46 of the Declaration states: ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States’. However, a decolonial imaginary requires delinking from the ‘political unity of sovereign and independent states’ because it is this unity that fixes colonial difference within global power structures, disallowing other modes of existence. Any alternative framework must take into account ‘the epistemic force of local histories and to think theory through the political praxis of subaltern groups, where the Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse’ (Escobar, 2004, p. 217). In rejecting the universalizing and totalizing claims of Western modernity, a decolonial imaginary does not privilege the nation state as a site for struggle because coloniality ensures that the state cannot be decolonized or democratized (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018). Instead, the decolonial project is a search for multiple local and regional forms of governance that avoids the pitfalls of undemocratic and repressive regimes which characterize contemporary liberal democracies. Scholarship on Indigenous sovereignty in Australia, the Americas and New Zealand has challenged dominant narratives about the founding of these nation states and documented how a false political authority was claimed through land that was ‘acquired’ forcibly or fraudulently and by unilateral extinguishment of native title (Hendrix, 2010). The triumphalist narratives of settler colonial states never pose the key question: ‘Where does the force of one law to extinguish the laws of the other draw its legitimacy from’? (Watson, 2006, p. 29). This denial of the original violence of state sovereignty and colonial histories along with an affirmation of Indigenous cultures becomes the basis of Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination (Volmert, 2010). Whether in settler colonies or post-colonial countries, Indigenous groups with distinct preferences and cultures remain marginalized minorities despite being bestowed with ‘citizen rights.’ Rather than participate in public will formation Indigenous peoples have the will of non-Indigenous citizens imposed on them and only a shift in political authority can change their current situation. While some advocates of deliberative democracy may be ‘greatly skeptical about the chances of survival’ of Indigenous communities (Benhabib, 2002, p. 185) their ongoing struggles to protect their lands indicate that resistance is fertile (Banerjee et al., 2021). These communities have been fighting to preserve their way of life since the colonial era began and their struggles continue in the postcolonial era. Colonial sovereignties of the modern nation state supersede Indigenous sovereignty and where there is conflict and dissent in deliberative procedures of public will formation the (post) colonial state exercises coercive power to impose the will of ‘the people’, as I discuss in the next section.

#### 5 -- Rhetorical Sovereignty DA -- Policy debate is invested in a false assumption of subjective citizenship and sovereignty that is *rooted in settler colonial consciousness* – Rhetorical spaces, like debate, layer ideological structures of settler reproduction which create the conditions for settler colonialism to reproduce itself.

* WSG=White Settler Governance

Lechuga 20 (Dr. Michael Lechuga researches and teaches Latina/o/x Studies Communication Studies, Rhetoric, Migration and Settler Colonialism Studies, and Affect Studies; “An anticolonial future: reassembling the way we do rhetoric”; Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies; December 4, 2020; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14791420.2020.1829659)//LASA-ERB

To answer the first claim—that US rhetoric is the communication practice of organizing people and materials to serve the needs of the colonial settlement—I begin by looking at the Aristotelian tradition’s ongoing influence on the field. Aristotle’s rhetoric is a publicfacing procedure for persuasion within a subjected citizenry. Its objective: to find all means that might convince an audience, not because dialectic deliberation will not work, but because “affecting the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge.” 1 Rhetoricians in the US still invested in Aristotle must account for this colonial carryover from Britain’s Aristotelian tradition. It represents particular fo rms of rhetorical criticism and pedagogical practices—like public speaking, debate, and oral defenses—that rely on a notion of subjective citizenship and sovereignty rooted in a colonial (then settler colonial) consciousness.2 Lauer argues, for example, that classical rhetoric was essential in propulsion of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire. As a result of Augustus’s shift from deliberative to epideictic rhetoric, the Roman Empire was able to sustain the spread of Roman ideology onto lands that would have otherwise exceeded its authority.3 Augustus knew that the legitimacy of the Roman Empire was contingent upon the ability to shape public memory so that Roman law would be seen as morally virtuous. Thus, the rhetorical authority of sovereignty was used to justify the expansion of the Roman Empire as a function of the persuasive power of its leaders. Mary E. Stucky and John M. Murphy describe the way rhetorical authority is used, much like the Romans, to also remove native peoples from their stewarded lands for economic exploitation in the US.4 In both cases, rhetorical subjection and claims to sovereignty are communicated onto bodies and lands, exerting a discursive force that commits colonial violence. The practice of issuing rhetorical authority is intrinsically connected to colonial modernity. From Aristotelian thought to the middle of the twentieth century, “rhetorical criticism” focused almost exclusively on studying a speaker’s capacity to persuade publics through oratory.5 This meant that a training in rhetoric required studying “the texts of speeches delivered by the common and uncommon men who attempted to crystallize and mold public thinking about the issues of their day.” 6 The purpose of this training was not to disrupt existing systems of domination but, rather, to replicate them: as important as public address [is] itself in understanding [US] American culture is the character of the training in rhetoric provided by the nation’s colleges and universities. Rhetoric and rhetorical training … reflect to some extent the demands and expectations of the environment; the public image of the orator inevitably influences the collegiate training of future orators.7 Raymie McKerrow suggests that this tradition of training orators was reflected in the field up until the critical turn in the 1970s where scholars then begin to turn to rhetorical criticism of social justice movements and scholars like Maurice Charland and Michael Calvin McGee begin to rethink rhetorical subjectivity. McKerrow also credits Walter Fisher for work on narrative rhetoric, which McKerrow argues gave the field a language to study a “rational world paradigm” through narrative fidelity—though this “world paradigm” was certainly not inclusive of the indigenous narrative epistemologies already circulating for centuries before the arrival of European rhetoric.8 While McKerrow argues that the 1970s moved US rhetoric past its European colonial roots and into a postmodern scholarly practice, much of the field continues to be entangled with processes of settler colonial modes of production: invoking political subjectivities, authorizing sovereignty, and narrating the settler colonial consciousness.9 Notably, the “the rhetoric of modernity” is a structural process driven by the production of colonial subjects (i.e., Christian, white) and capitalist practices of production which originated in Europe and were spread throughout the Americas via genocide, occupation, enslavement, and war.10 Ultimately, the rhetoric of modernity is about the sovereignty constructed through a European ideological paradigm that was deduced from the rhetorical authority invented by monarchs, trade companies, and churches. Furthermore, that sovereignty exerted over colonial subjects relies on a distribution of settler colonial narratives that exist on a trajectory that has not quite finished the settler colonial project; settling for rhetorics of liberal modernity simply “crucially contributes to blocking out indigenous peoples’ struggles for a post-settler colonial future.” 11 Thus, it is not enough to say that rhetoric is “the study” of how settler colonial ideology is communicated. Rather, it is a specific public-facing communication practice that organizes people and materials (especially land) to serve the needs of a settlement through claims of political sovereignty. Furthermore, rhetoric produces and circulates narrative forms that foreclose a postsettler future by reproducing the same sets of relationships between bodies, lands, and power both in our research practices (as I will describe below) and in our pedagogies (like debate, public speaking, etc). Claim #2: assemblage theory frames rhetoric as an organizing logic Embedded within the theory of assemblages is a way to consider how communication moves ideological power onto bodies and throughout territories. Research on White Settler Governance (WSG) emerging from Canadian Cultural Studies reverberates Walter Mignolo and Lorenzo Veracini’s sentiment on the importance of studying the mechanisms of production behind settler colonialism. Scott Lauria Morgensen relies on a framework rooted in Foucault’s biopolitics and settler colonial studies to describe how WSG is founded by apparatuses of power that persist in producing populations and institutions that can reproduce settler logics: the biopolitics of settler colonialism will explain that the colonial era never ended … . Theories of the biopolitical state, regimes of global governance, and the war on terror will be insufficient unless they critically theorise settler colonialism as a historical and present condition and method of all such power.12 Settler colonialism, thus, is not simply a condition that afflicts native peoples and lands, but is a method settler states undertake in order to layer ideological structures of settler production like universities, hospitals, and courts onto yet settler-occupied territories. I argue that this is a communicable method. Patrick Wolfe suggests WSG organizes and endures through material mechanisms of ideological replacement, those that eliminate native peoples from lands and then occupy those lands indefinitely: “settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event … elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence … . Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 13 What settler colonialism replaces, though, is the order of how sets of relations between lands, peoples, and ideologies are mapped out onto invaded territories. As a structure of settler ideological power—or what I refer to as an assemblage—WSG persist in territorializing native lands and eliminating native peoples through organizing logics of subjectivity and sovereignty circulated through narratives of settler logic. Conventional rhetoric’s “agonistic” emphasis on evaluating the efficacy of a given presidential address, congressional debate, or other communicative practice is inherently conservative, and thus settler colonial, for it positions the WSG status quo as a given; that is, when the organizing logics of settler colonialism are communicated effectively, this is “effective” rhetoric. Therefore, to frame rhetoric as the communicable organizing logics of WSG, a study of assemblages is warranted. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, assemblages are an “ad hoc logic” about the ways social formations rely on a combination of heterogeneous, material and human parts to create change.14 Assemblages are like self-replicating, overdetermined political machines where many seemingly random materials are arranged in a self-reinforcing fashion to produce and sustain a particular outcome. While Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of political desire is ultimately framed in the context of late capitalism, thinking through their conception of assemblage as it is moved by a settler colonial desire—a desire Mignolo asserts is dually capitalistic and genocidally white supremacist—warrants a discussion of how political ideologies of domination are assembled by rhetorical logics. For one, assemblages are not things, and they do not produce things; they are arrangements of things.15 Assemblages, though, do territorialize and code particular annunciations with an organizing logic. In this case, materials and bodies are arranged and mobilized on territories according to the logics of settler desire (resource extraction, labor extraction, and genocide), which has the dual effect of creating the conditions for settler logic to reproduce. For DeLanda, this point is particularly important: what one feels as an effect (or affect) from assemblages is the sense that territories are being reshaped and bodies recoded to be more conducive to the reproduction of the assemblage.16 This facet of assemblages intersects with the biopolitical study of WSG by explaining the ways ideological structures of power arrange racial and economic hierarchies in the service of producing the conditions by which settler colonialism can reproduce. The other facet of assemblage, and the one that pertains most to the study of rhetoric, is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the abstract machine. An assemblage comprises the abstract machine, the concrete (material) components, and the personae (bodies). The abstract machine is the organizing logic of an assemblage: “the condition of an assemblage is abstract because it is not a thing or object that exists in the world, but rather something that lays out a set of relations wherein concrete elements and agencies appear.” 17 Thus, the abstract machine of an assemblage organizes the materials (including and especially land) and personae of the assemblage in a way that their sets of relationships affect the flows of power toward a particular desire. In the case of WSG, the capacity to call settler colonial subjects into being, the capacity to make sovereignty claims over native lands, and the capacity to normalize this invasive process through religious or grand global political narrative is organized by the abstract machine of settler logic—or what I described earlier as rhetoric. The abstract machine layers power over bodies and lands in a way that reshapes them to reproduce structures of settler power. In other words, settler colonial governance is an assemblage of ideological power in North America that territorializes the lands stewarded by native peoples, codes the bodies of native, Mestizx, and black peoples as Other, and shapes rhetorical/communicable landscapes into spaces conducive to the reproduction of the settlement. Rhetoric is the organizing logic of this white settler assemblage that is continuously communicated (discursively and affectively) to arrange the relationships between settler bodies, native bodies, occupied lands, and technologies of occupation. These tenets of rhetoric are articulated in the organizational logic of settler colonialism. We cannot undo settler colonialism unless we confront the normalization of these logics and begin to rearticulate an anticolonial praxis-driven method for studying rhetoric. This work—if it assumes that conventional rhetoric is, in fact, the organizing logic of the settler colonial assemblage in North America—can undo our complicity as rhetoricians to reproduce settler colonialism.

#### 6 -- Radical Imagination DA -- Radical imagination of alternative political realities within forums of discourse is a core part of shaping lived reality – institutions of colonialism are held in place through the imaginative capacities of social actors.

Haiven ’17 -- writer and teacher and Canada Research Chair in the Radical Imagination. He is editor of VAGABONDS, a series of short, radical books from Pluto Press. He teaches at Lakehead University on Anishinaabe territories on the North Shore of Gitchigumi. He co-directs the ReImagining Value Action Lab (RiVAL), a workshop for the radical imagination, social justice and decolonization. (Max Haiven, 2017, “The USES of FINANCIAL LITERACY”, Cultural Politics, Volume 13, Issue 3, Duke University Press, DOI: 10.1215/17432197-4211350, accessed 7-4-2022) -- nikki

The Radical Imagination The preceding section examines how colonial ideologies and discourses were reinforced and challenged in financial literacy texts targeting Indigenous people. I have undertaken such an analysis not in the name of improving Indigenous financial literacy education or making any suggestions regarding alternatives: as a settler subject in Canada, I don’t believe that is my place. Rather, I wish to ask what we, as settlers (and those who, more broadly, benefit from settler colonialism), can learn from the foregoing discussion as it relates to the radical transformation of settler culture, society, economics, and politics. How Indigenous people organize and strategize to survive and rebel against colonialist neoliberal extractive capitalism is vitally important, but not my jurisdiction (see Lowman and Barker 2015). I am interested in how settlers, the beneficiaries of colonialist neoliberal extractive capitalism (to different extents, based on class, race, gender, and other forms of oppression; see, e.g., Day 2016), can better rebel from within, in part by learning from (and taking risky action in solidarity with) Indigenous struggles. For me, the notion of the radical imagination is crucial. The radical imagination in this sense implies the ability to recognize that the present social order is neither inevitable nor necessary; there have been, there are, and there could yet be other modes for organizing social life (see Graeber 2007). Here, the example of Indigenous social, political, and economic systems in the past and in the present can be vital, though we are wise to recognize that gazing at them can also invite the colonial maneuver of romanticization and appropriation. The radical imagination is not a normative category and does not map neatly onto any one ideological, political, or identitarian approach. Rather, as Cornelius Castoriadis (1997a) argues, the radical imagination is a constant force of disruption, questioning, and creativity working at the very core of the individual and of society. Castoriadis (1997b) posed the radical imagination as the elemental protean substance of the human subject, but also of social institutions writ large. The institutions of marriage, the police, and the education system, all social power formations, even when concretely or brutally material, are held in place and reproduced through the imaginative work of social actors. Castoriadis likens it to magma, a substance that is at times fluid but at other times solidifies, only to become liquid again at the next tectonic eruption. Following Castoriadis, Alex Khasnabish and I have approached the radical imagination not as a private possession located in the mind of the individual but as a collective process that emerges from dialogue, debate, and peoples’ often fraught and difficult solidarity in the face of social power relations (Haiven and Khasnabish 2014). From Robin D. G. Kelley’s (2002) study of the traditions of the Black radical imagination we have learned about the way the radical imagination echoes between social movements, cultural producers, and intellectuals, not only within particular struggles and locales but globally in an interconnected age. This approach affirms Marcel Stoetzler and Nira YuvalDavis’s (2002) argument that the imagination is not some transcendental universal force but a situated one, contingent on how it is diversely expressed and articulated in bodies intersected by the forces of racialization, gender expression, sexuality, citizenship, ability, and so on.

#### 7 -- Cyclical Spectatorship DA -- Their model of debate is premised on the “knowing subject” of colonial modernity that operates untouched by racial configurations of power – vote affirmative to decenter their epistemology of scholarly detachment.

Mignolo ’09 -- (Walter D. Mignolo, 2009, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26.7-8 (2009): 159–181, <https://www.academia.edu/3763158/Epistemic_Disobedience_Independent_Thought_and_Decolonial_Freedom?auto=citations&from=cover_page>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and de-colonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why eurocentered epistemology carefully hidden (in the social sciences, in the humanities, in the natural sciences and professional schools, in think tanks of the financial sector and the G8 or G20), its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations? The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic de-colonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo- historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that [they] had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas.

### 2AC -- FW -- Subject Formation

#### 1 -- Debate does shape subject formation -- but not the way they think it does -- they are correct that their model of debate is going nowhere, the conversations that take place over policy proposals are never exported bc only a small fraction of debaters can ever actualize them but epistemic reorientations can be adopted and forwarded by anyone and shape subjectivity through the process of debate itself -- reading shcolarship in debate increases exposure to it and forces other teams to engage it and think through its arguments which iteratively creates consciousness that can be mobilized against cybernetic thought – even if its not 100% any risk of reorienting the direction of debate within this round is good – alt causes don’t disprove the risk of debate contributing to subject formaiton

#### 2 -- Antagonism is wrong – our iterative process of subject formation overcomes it – in the initial days of the louisville project that prioritized affective strategies they lost a lot of debates and encouraged policy debaters to recommit to their ideologies but eventually as they started winning major tournamets and eventually took several NDTs the debate community writ large was forced to shift its norms to account for the inevitable presence of kritikal argumentation and refine predisposations that they had previously held – i.e. the cumulative effect of many ballots solves our offense

#### 3 -- Even if they say “its just one ballot” your ballot is an ethical commitment – this argument is bidirectional – your ballot cannot impose fairness onto debate writ large – k deabaters read their shit and disrupt procedural fairness regardless of whether or not you vote aff, your ballot can only impose a fraemwork on this debate in line with one of two competing theories for what the ballot could function as – either you vote aff and use the ballot to align this debate with counter-revolutionary tactics that bracket out marginalized scholarship or you vote neg and participate in the revolution – make your ballot one of the thousand ballots that change norms in debate – anythig else is self defeating – why vote in elections if your ballot alone isn’t the brink ? bc that logic applied to every ballot would be counter-revolutionary and actually preclude change

Remedy procedural inequity ? why is it proportional to the fairness lost by the aff, why doesn’t it just incentivize affs to write a better 2AC

Cory johnson – lawyer getting phd running for political office

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Fairness

#### 1 -- It’s a sliding scale – sacrificing a marginal amount of procedural fairness in order to build a net more ethical game is better than maintaining the gold standard of fairness while pushing indigenous debaters out of the activity -- decades of topic based policy debate let to almost no minority participation—A few years of allowing alternative approaches has significantly increased it—It’s not a coincidence.

#### 2 -- Their interpretation creates an arbitrary burden of “exportability” on marginalized debaters that the negative gets to circumvent through fabricated white debate norms such as fiat that decreases the burdens debate places on white political strategies – this turns their fairness claims by forcing us to delineate the macropolitical implementation of our methods while all they have to do is read an eight second plan text.

#### 3 -- Structural unfairness outweighs and reverses your decisionmaking calculus – they have conceded a uniqueness claim status quo is not a level playing field but rather is structurally skewed against indigenous scholarship and marginalized debaters writ large– if your role is to vote for the most fair model of debate overall then you vote negative to correct for the foundational imbalance that exists in debate which requires some instances of procedural unfairness towards normative policy debaters in order to establish competitive equilibrium

#### 4 -- Confrontation with colonialism necessitates epistemic disobedience – refusal to conform to the rules of the game calls into question the assumptions that sustain racialized violence within debate.

Mignolo ’09 -- (Walter D. Mignolo, 2009, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26.7-8 (2009): 159–181, <https://www.academia.edu/3763158/Epistemic_Disobedience_Independent_Thought_and_Decolonial_Freedom?auto=citations&from=cover_page>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts [themself] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean 4 Theory, Culture & Society 26(7–8) and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker. In semiotics, a basic distinction has been made (Emile Benveniste) between the enunciation and the enunciated. The distinction was necessary, for Benveniste, to ground the floating sign central to Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology and its development in French structuralism. Benveniste turned to the enunciation and, by doing so, to the subject producing and manipulating signs, rather than the structure of the sign itself (the enunciated). With this distinction in mind, I would venture to say that the interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated while patriarchy and racism are grounded in the enunciation. Let’s explore it in more detail (Benveniste, 1970; Todorov, 1970).

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Clash

#### 1 -- Our interpretation doesn’t sanction choosing any interpretation of the resolution but rather delimits the means by which we access discussions of water protection

#### 2 -- Their iterative testing arguments are irrelevant – there’s no value in applying it to the resolution because we don’t adopt the resolution at the end of the season so finding the “best policy option” is immaterial, only our interp allows us to test things we can actually implement

#### 3 -- Our top level criticism of their interpretation turns clash – if we win any of our reasons why debates under their interpretation result in unethical subject formation then their defense of clash reflects a drive to perfect modes of racialized violence – refinement and reflexivity over a political project that is fundamentally colonial can only ever produce more efficacious forms of exclusion

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Skills/Deliberation

#### 1 -- Erasure DA – their interpretations reliance on the fiated evaluation of consequences as the “correct” modality of skill building and competitive testing replicates the logics of indigenous boarding schools in which white teachers viewed themselves as being neutral adjudicators providing native children with the portable skills they needed to function and succeed in settler society – their model of debate preserves the colonial order of knowledge within debate by training indigenous debaters in the art of conceding to the coercive regime of the settler state while expunging the cultural divergence of critical indigenous theory that never gets debated under their model – criticism on the level of knowledge production is a core strategy of indigenous liberation that allows for a re-reading of the world on the terms of alternative thought systems and offers a basis to criticize the tacit epistemic assumptions that sustain settler governance – we’ll cross apply the haiven card from the alt debate – it indicates that settler society is held in place by the imagination of social actors which means that alternative imaginations on the level of research paradigms should be engaged and deliberated over in debate in order to challenge the core of settler power

#### 2 -- Cruel optimism DA – their interpretation forces indigenous debaters to invest their affective and pychological labor into political structures that in the real world have never and will never work towards their liberation – this is a cross application of the ontology debate, this reproduces false hope that causes psychological violence and racial battle fatigue – how is the aff going to stand up and tell indigenous people to continue expending their psychic energy on a losing battle ? this comes first because it forecloses meaningful engagement with things like clash and research skills – education and fairness both come secondary to inclusion – its an ethical d rule that controls who the debate space is for in the first place

#### 3 -- Their model of procedural fairness and clash is premised on the value of deliberative democratic discouse as a model of producing effective and rational decisionmaking – this legitimates colonial violence by assuming the absence of imperial asymmetries of power in discursive spaces.

Banerjee ’21 -- Professor of Management and Associate Dean of Research & Enterprise at Bayes Business School. He was also Director of the Executive PhD program from 2013 to 2019. His primary research interests are in the areas of corporate social irresponsibility, sustainability, climate change and resistance movements. Other research interests include critical management studies, Indigenous ecology, and postcolonial studies. (Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, 10-10-2021, “Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives From Below”, Journal of Business Ethics, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5>, accessed 7-3-2022) -- nikki

The Contents and Discontents of Deliberative Democracy The year 2019 will be remembered as the year of protest with millions of people taking to the streets in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe to express their frustration with their political leaders. We appear to be in the middle of a democratic recession: approval ratings for most politicians and political parties across the world are abysmal, there are deep divisions in most Western democracies, and public trust in democratic institutions are at record lows (Fishkin & Mansbridge, 2017). The democratic boom following the wave of political decolonization in the 1950s and the end of the Cold War appears to be well and truly over with the rise of authoritarianism, social unrest, state repression of dissent, increasing human rights violations, government crackdown on free speech, violent conficts over natural resource extraction and an increase in modern slavery, all of which are happening in ‘democratic’ countries (Amnesty International, 2019). Democracy, or at least the model of dominant party system representative democracy in Europe and the United States appears to be under threat. The recognition that in modern liberal Western democracies formal democracy through majority rule precluded genuine participation of citizens led to a ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The deliberative turn, pioneered by the philosophies of Habermas and Rawls and further elaborated by political theorists like Cohen, Dryzek, Fishkin, Gutmann, Mansbridge, and Thompson among others, began as a normative project that focused on deliberation as an ideal rational discourse where consensus was reached freely and without coercion. Political legitimacy was thus established through deliberative processes that refected the discursive quality of decision making rather than representation through voting. Rationality of a democracy according to Habermas (1975, p. 32) was less about majority rule, which could not represent the interests of all citizens, but should be based on the ‘genuine participation of citizens in political will formation.’ Thus, more participatory forms of democracy required a deliberative ideal involving a discursive process where citizens could freely communicate as equals to arrive at a rational consensus on decisions afecting their lives. Merely acknowledging diferences and inequalities does not make them disappear. Rather than seek an authoritarian consensus, a truly deliberative framework would need to accommodate confict and dissent as well. Moufe (1999) argues that a preoccupation with procedural issues relating to consensus depoliticizes the public sphere and that a robust and vibrant public sphere needs to embrace confict and dissent. A more radical and progressive democratic politics would transform antagonism into ‘agonistic pluralism’ where political contestations refect not ‘antagonism between enemies but agonism between adversaries’ (Moufe, 1999, p. 754). The aim is to ‘domesticate’ destructive antagonism into a constructive agonism where democratic decisions may or may not be fully consensual but can also respectfully accept unresolvable disagreements’ (Hillier, 2003, p. 42). Or as Foucault (1984, p. 379) puts it ‘one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.’ Deliberative democrats have acknowledged these critiques and attempted to broaden the scope of deliberative democracy to accommodate exclusions and inequalities. For instance, consensus—the desired outcome of deliberation—was seen as not always desirable even when possible (Gutmann & Thompson, 2018). Habermas’s later work also adopted a more fexible approach, acknowledging that ‘in the case of controversial existential questions arising from diferent worldviews even the most rationally conducted discursive engagement will not lead to consensus’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 43). The task then of a successful deliberative politics is to institutionalize appropriate procedures that can enable rational discourse among informed publics. This ‘public sphere’ is the institutionalized discursive space where ordinary citizens could deliberate about politics, the economy, and other issues that afected their lives. Habermas’s notion of a public sphere was based on a historical analysis of the emergence of new forms of public interaction that took place in cofee houses, salons, and public squares during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, feminist and postcolonial scholars have critiqued Habermas’s notion of public sphere as being exclusionary and lacking in open access, participation and social equality that are key to democratic deliberation. If the public sphere was the space where consensus was being manufactured it becomes a new site of hegemonic domination (Fraser, 1990). The merchants and intellectuals who deliberated in cafes and salons about the weighty political and social issues of their time would in all probability have not appreciated the fact that the cofee they consumed was produced by slave labor in the colonies (Eze, 1997). Moreover, as Fraser (1990) points out, opinion forming in the public sphere does not translate into actual decision-making in the political sphere, and even if such an extension were possible it would entrench existing hegemonies and reinforce existing structural inequalities and exclusions. While ideal conditions of deliberative discourse may exist and enable rational consensus among wealthy residents of suburban Frankfurt or Princeton deliberating about the installation of additional streetlights in their neighborhood, it is difcult to imagine how Indigenous communities in the Brazilian Amazon can engage in deliberative discourse as equal citizens with powerful market and state actors intent on expanding mining and logging on Indigenous lands. Even in urban contexts it would be naïve to expect that citizens can participate as equals, respectfully, and exercise their reason freely given the realities of structural inequalities and discriminations based on race, class, gender and sexual orientation. Another signifcant shortcoming in deliberative theories is its lack of a sophisticated analysis of power, which seems to be treated almost like an exogenous variable. The liberal quest for legitimacy seemingly elides notions of power and authority because a key assumption of the deliberative ideal is the absence of coercive power. Legitimacy of a consensus produced by communicative rationality can also be hegemonic because one cannot assume that legitimacy always exists without domination (Clegg, & Haugaard, 2009; Moufe, 1999). Some scholars argue that deliberative democracy has a ‘nuanced view of power’ because it acknowledges that coercive power can exist in deliberative practice (Curato et al., 2017, p. 31). However, they claim it is possible to limit coercive power through good ‘procedural design’ involving selection of ‘less partisan’ participants, using independent facilitators or making deliberations public. Such an approach to power is patently unsatisfactory because it elides relationships between power, legitimacy and authority. How does ‘procedural design’ handle dissent or confict? And if there is no dissent or confict in deliberations then has there been an elite capture of the process by excluding or marginalizing dissenting stakeholders? Deliberative democrats also assume that power, and sometimes coercion, is needed in a deliberative process, especially when implementing decisions contested by certain groups even if the deliberative process was fair and reasoned (Curato et al., 2017). So the assumption is that the state, the only ‘legitimate’ source of coercive power, can and should use coercion to implement decisions arrived at in deliberative forums. As we shall see later when we discuss conficts over natural resources, this is clearly an untenable argument because it legitimizes the use of state violence to implement decisions made in deliberative forums characterized by vastly structurally unequal conditions that disempower marginalized populations. Debates about deliberative democracy elide power dynamics in the broader political economy in which deliberative processes are embedded (Dryzek, 2016). In cases where there are signifcant power asymmetries and where actions can have serious economic, social and environmental impacts on communities as is the case with extractive industries, procedural design, however carefully designed, cannot accommodate divergent and sometimes incommensurable views on land use. Rather institutional, material, and discursive power that constitute the global political economy determine governance structures and processes of natural resource extraction. These forms of power somehow remain ‘outside’ of deliberative discourse but create particular forms of legitimacy that deny pluralism of values and rationalities thus marginalizing the legitimate struggles of populations whose values do not conform to the ‘norm’ (Banerjee, 2018, p. 804). To summarize: despite its shortcomings there appears to be consensus among scholars in the feld that a deliberative process can ‘help revive democratic legitimacy, provide for more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground between widely mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfll some of our common normative expectations about democracy’ (Fishkin & Mansbridge, 2017, p. 6). But is this optimism unfounded? What are the silences and erasures in deliberative democracy? Are there limits to ‘authentic public will formation’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’ that marginalize segments of the citizenry? These are some questions I explore in the next section. Postcolonial and Decolonial Deliberations What is remarkable about the various debates in deliberative democracy is the silence about Western colonialism, especially in Habermas’s universalizing notion of communicative rationality. Similar silences can be seen in the work of some Enlightenment thinkers whose concession (and complicity) to slavery and colonialism is paradoxical and puzzling given their proclamations of universal freedom (Dhawan, 2014; Eze, 1997). Enlightenment reasoning and philosophies of history provided an intellectual justifcation of more than two hundred years of colonialism. There was little awareness that the much-celebrated use of reason also creates new forms of domination, even more insidious than coercive power because these forms of domination are justifed by reason itself (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972). Liberal ideas of freedom, progress, development, and democracy are deeply embedded in the idea of Empire, whose mission involved political subjugation of those it sought to empower and civilize without a critical refexivity of the impact of European colonialism on European philosophy (Banerjee & Arjaliès, 2021). Even the Frankfurt School, despite its infuential work on domination in modern society and critiques of the Enlightenment, is as Said (1993, p. 278) points out ‘stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire’. It is important we engage with these critiques to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the complex historical relationships between colonialism and democracy and more importantly identify what traces continue to exist in contemporary political thought. As Fabian (2002, p. 33) points out, good or bad intentions do not alone invalidate knowledge: for that to happen ‘it takes bad epistemology which advances cognitive interests without regard for its ideological presuppositions.’ And certainly one could argue there is an epistemological closure in EuroAmerican representations of democracy that does not recognize attempts by postcolonial countries to create their own forms of governance consistent with their own conceptions of freedom and rights because they may not conform to ‘ideal’ standards (Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). If Enlightenment inspired ideas of democracy elides historical facts about slavery and colonialism then it becomes imperative to reimagine democracy while maintaining the Enlightenment’s spirit of critique, or as Marx puts it ‘the weapon of the criticism cannot replace criticism of the weapon.’

#### 4 -- “Decision making skills” and “deliberation” reproduce anti-black coloniality – they’re directly tied to the history of colonial governance and expansion – their model of debate reproduces *the grammar of racial hierarchy*

Lowe 15

(Lisa Lowe, Professor of English and American Studies at Tufts University, and a member of the consortium of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora, The Intimacies of Four Continents, pgs. 110-113)

After the Treaty of Nanjing concluding the First Opium War, Anglo-American “free trade” practices in China and in the new colony of Hong Kong required new measures in liberal government that included improvised emergency powers, compulsory registration of non- Europeans, and military and police regulations to suppress social unrest and riots. The liberal rule of law provided for the state’s “legitimate” violence against the threat of “illegitimate” violence from others it deemed criminals, dissenters, and disturbers of the “peace.” These military, naval, and police regulations employed in the name of “liberty” became regular parts of the governance of both Hong Kong and the Chinese treaty ports, until the century’s end. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, a large migrant Chinese population, displaced by famine, poverty, and the war with England, was criminalized in Hong Kong by English law, producing a significant part of the population of “coolies” exported from the treaty ports to North and South America, the Caribbean, Australia, Hawaii, and other parts of Asia. Needless to say, these connections are not represented as such in the colonial archive. Rather, through unlikely, contiguous methods of reading correspondence, treaties, and legal ordinances, we may find a genealogy of liberal governance that discloses its role in imperial innovation.35

Correspondence between Governors and the Foreign Office suggests that the British aimed both to accommodate residual practices and to experiment with new logics. British rule in the new Crown Colony of Hong Kong in the early nineteenth century included colonial conquest and martial law to claim land and organize the conduct of the colonized population, yet it profited from promoting nominally “free” yet coerced migrant labor. It refined methods for profit that drew from practices resembling both monopoly and “free trade,” and it employed an older-style colonial occupation with new forms of security to govern “free” movement outside and beyond directly occupied territories. In other words, the history of liberalism in the context of the British trades with India and China after the First Opium War included both the promotion of ideas of freedom, free labor, and free trade, and the elaboration of specific modes for governing liberty in the colonies and beyond.

There is arguably no better authority than John Stuart Mill for our specification of the principles of liberal government in the nineteenth century. Mill’s corpus exemplifies a system of liberal thought unique in both range and specificity; it presents a synthetic worldview, whose elements—education, moral philosophy, laws, political economy, government, and logic—mediate and manage the problem of government in Britain and in the larger empire. His ideas on education were at the center of his system of moral and social progress and exemplified his teleology of improvement, the end of which was the common good. In his essays on education, as well as in the Autobiography, On Liberty, and Representative Government, he emphasized education, as the crucial means to moral and social progress. Liberal education was not merely training in languages and literature, mathematics and scientific method, logic, history, political economy, and law, but more allegorically, it is what gives “a comprehensive and connected view of the things . . . already learnt separately, a philosophic study of the Methods of the sciences; the modest in which the human intellect proceeds from the known to the unknown.”36 Mental and moral development depended on reflection, speculation, and improvement, and the cooperation with others to promote the common good.37 Education was necessary for character formation, socialization, and the proper development of the moral and civic subjectivity of the “competent agent” within deliberative participatory democracy.

For Mill, “liberty” expressed the capacity for improvement in individual man and in collective mankind and exemplified the “permanent interests of man as a progressive being.”38 While manifest in freedom of thought, speech, individual autonomy, and the right to education and self-development, Mill was more concerned to define liberty as “Civil or Social liberty,” or the principle that determines “the nature and limits of power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”39 By “liberty,” Mill did not mean the narrower ideas of individual right or free will, but rather “liberty” was the overarching principle that both defined political sovereignty in liberal society, and which authorized the differentiated power of government over “backward” peoples. Mill stated that “this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children. . . . We may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as its nonage.”40 As the sovereign power over a population to prepare them for self-government, “liberty” promised the amelioration of human culture, society, and civilization, unfolding in time. Mill characterized this formative process of socialization into liberty as “the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control” that leads to “the regulation of human conduct.”41 Like utilitarian thinkers Jeremy Bentham and Mill’s father, James Mill, who were concerned with the “governmental character” of liberalism, John Stuart Mill also emphasized that liberal freedom included discipline.42 In utilitarianism, additional freedoms necessarily required additional control and regulation; in this sense, control was not a counterprinciple to freedom; it was the condition from which it arises. Liberty depended on education and “good government” to cultivate subjects to judge and discern beyond the “yoke of opinion.”43 In this sense, “education,” broadly understood, was the synthetic link between individual subjectivity and the state. Through the educative function of civil and social institutions, law, culture, the workplace, and the state, citizen-subjects are formed not only for representative government, but also for participation in liberal society itself.44

Mill did not limit his definition of “good government” to representative government alone. Rather, “good government” was that which maintained “Order and Progress,” and could discern the form of ad- ministration that would “preserve the peace,” not only in Britain, but also throughout the English-speaking Commonwealth, and in the Asian and African colonies.45 Maintaining order and progress meant precisely calibrating what form of government was appropriate “for England and France,” on the one hand, or “for Bedouins and Malays,” on the other, for discerning “the state of different communities, in point of culture and development, [ranging] downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts.”46 Thus, the concept of “government” coincides with nineteenth-century narratives of civilization that enforced a hierarchy of nations, races, and cultures, and a linear development from non-Western “primitive” to “civilized” Europe. It justified, in Mill’s writings, the despotism of colonial rule for those “unfit” for representative government, as a means of bringing the backward, violent, and undeveloped peoples of the non-European world into the universal civilization of Europe. Yet it is not simply that Mill’s thought merely accommodated colonial domination; rather his ideas provided the terms, logics, and powers through which older colonial domination was rationalized and new forms of imperial domination were innovated and executed. If we examine Mill’s Considerations of Representative Government (1861), in relationship to his writings on the East India Company, we appreciate that he explained “liberty” consistently through the division of those “incapable of self-government” from those with the capacity for liberty. Representative Government begins and ends with explicit discussions of the need for authoritarian government in colonial India as a means of progress toward liberty and civilization

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Limits

#### 1 -- Accessibility DA – we are impact turning the limits they have chosen to defend – you should ask yourself what content is excluded from their vision of debates over the resolution – only our model of debate allows valuable and exportable training for marginalized debaters to combat the violence scripted onto them – their model greenlights a form of epistemic exclusion in which we only deliberate over political praxes that have only ever served whiteness

Ground determines limits – if theres sufficient ground it doesn’t matter bc you’ll always have something to say

The way limits gets weaponized

Focus your ptx time on writing a new k

Exceptionalism offense about why do policy affs never hti one off t – they don’t threaten the knowledge order of debate

You thinky ou don’t have to engage

What would you do if a policy team dropped the case

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Predictability

#### Predictability is bad –

#### 1 -- Predicrability is the antithesis of revolution – forcing aff advocacies to be predictable precludes the introducing of innovative ideas that break the boundaries of academic colonialism – prerec to solving real world violence

#### 2 – “Predictable stasis points” are not mutually agreed upon or consensual – the topic is not neutral but is instead inherently political and tied to the authoruty of whiteness in debate via white male coaches dominating the topic selection process and developing framework arguments to limit out black success in debate – destabilizing that authority is good, forces a reversal of historical inequities

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: Scenario Planning

#### 1 -- Scenario planning is bad – its results in the discursive colonization of future worlds and bolsters the hegemonic governance of militaristic imperial powers.

Ossewaarde ’17 -- Associate professor in governance, society and technology, University of Twente (Marinus Ossewaarde, 7-21-2017, “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program”, Futures, Volume 93, pg. 80-88, <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.futures.2017.07.003>, accessed 7-4-2022) -- nikki

Colonization and the closing of futures Scenario planning is meant to be a dialectical quest for open futures, whereby alternative worlds are envisioned and judgement as to the most desirable world is suspended. Such a dialogical process, associated with democratic politics of world making, typically implies the critique, negation and transcendence of the established power constellation, which is by its very nature conservative. Hence, power holders are tempted to believe that their rule is indefinite and that history has ended – since all activities are directed towards the maintenance of the current order. Conversely, action, which ‘has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries’ is discouraged (Arendt 1958: 190). Hannah Arendt therefore went so far as claiming that ‘action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle’ (Arendt 1958: 246). Established power elites may have an interest in scenario planning, but the future with which they are fascinated is the prolongation of their current worlds. In other words, scenario planning is used for colonizing the future. In a colonized ‘scenario planning’, predominant or currently powerful stakeholders do not search for alternative futures, but, instead, enact their own ideological discourses, imaginaries and frames. The current power constellation is left unquestioned, and taken for granted in the scenario planning, as if established power factions will perdure in the future. The negation of wellestablished biases and prejudices is held in check, in order to safeguard the status quo. Such conservativism is legitimized by referring to current trends that are endowed with the aura of necessity or inevitability (natural and eternal laws). A colonized ‘scenario planning’ therefore masks unequal and often illegitimate power relationships. Historically, it appears that scenario planning has more often than not been a tool for colonization, designed to secure the future rule of the established power complex. In the 1940s, Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation developed scenario planning to enable US military rulers to forecast the moves of potential opponents and to accordingly develop counteroffensives in the nuclear arms race (Tevis 2010). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack and Royal Dutch/Shell established scenario planning activities as an integral part of strategic management, to secure oil interests in the context of ecological crisis and the oil crisis (Wack 1985; Chermack and Coons 2015). The stimulus for scenario planning in these cases was the perceived rise of uncertainties in a world that had become more unpredictable and potentially apocalyptic. Horror scenarios of nuclear wars and a Third World War had become commonplace in the 1950s. Stories of ecological catastrophe, with a vision of large tracts of the earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global food production, the acidification of the oceans, sea-level rise and storms, and droughts of growing intensity, became common since the publication of the Club of Rome report in 1972 (Wright et al 2013). In the hands of ruling military, governmental and corporate powers, ‘scenario planning’ became a method for ensuring strategic victory in a context of uncertainties and complexities. Since such scenario planning aimed at predictability, ambiguities were undesirable factors that were better eliminated, both in theory and practice (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Computer simulations, game theoretic tools, forecasting methods, trend research, horizon scanning, and visual imageries filtered out all that which could not be mapped (O’Brien 2016). Pierre Wack, who introduced scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, emphasizes that the future is only half closed. He made a plea for the incorporation of both literary and technical methods in scenario planning, to facilitate both the imagination and calculation of probable futures (Chermack and Coons 2015). According to Wack, the future is partly determined by trends that cannot but persist (Van‘t Klooster and Van Asselt 2006). Population growth and ageing are examples of such trends; and the corresponding implications for food demand, transport, housing, and other kinds of infrastructure clearly have to be reckoned with in any scenario planning. At the same time, for Wack, the future cannot be fully outlined based on these data and graphics. The partial openness of the future lies in the unpredictability of future generations’ actions in reaction to these trends. Robotic warfare is one possible future; large-scale euthanasia is another. But it is also imaginable that ecological disasters may wipe off entire populations. These futures are imaginable and yet not simply fictive because the ‘material’ for their ‘creation’ is already available here and now. For instance, it is highly probable that white Americans will no longer be the majority population in the United States by 2050, but the question as to how white Americans will cope with living as a minority in the US invites different answers (Martín Alcoff 2015: 24; 26). Colonization aims at ruling out openness, with the aim of shaping a future (preferably one that seems to be the product of predetermined trends that cannot be altered by human decisions) in which the current status quo is preserved. O’Brien (2016) explains that Royal Dutch/Shell’s interest in scenario planning is motivated by its will to shape a future in which remains a dominant key actor that moulds the world in its own interest: its scenario planning practices and its wish to maintain its hegemony are interconnected. ‘Shell’s scenario plans,’ O’Brien (2016: 334) notes, ‘are credited with the company’s success in outwitting the thugs, and thereby contributing to the larger project of securing Western interests amidst the turmoil of globalization.’ Such a hegemonic project has its prices in terms of human rights abuses, oil pollution and corporate crimes (Holzer 2007; Hennchen 2015). The organized fossilfuel industry is powerful enough to protect its vested interests and to promote a strategy of inaction (no reduction of fossil-fuel emissions), so that nothing really changes. Michael Mann, a leading climate scientist, explains that to safeguard the current status quo, the fossil-fuel industry, including Royal Dutch/Shell, funds a ‘climate change denial campaign’ to discredit climate science – which advocates radical change now – and prevent dialogues. In this campaign, a significant part of the established power elites, including the Koch Brothers, and influential politicians like John McCain and Joe Lieberman, makes a mockery of climatology, and of particular scientists (Wright and Mann 2013). The pertinent question that ought to be raised, O’Brien (2016: 341) therefore concludes is: ‘whose future is being planned, by whom, for whom and to what ultimate end?’ When scenario planning is a tool for colonization, the future is planned by and for the established power constellation, even if ‘larger’ entities such as national, European or Western interests are invoked. Such scenario planning is legitimized by discrediting ‘doom scenarios’, through discourses on the liberating potential of technology (which should be able to solve the problems that it creates) and (correspondingly) on the inevitable course of history.

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: TVA

#### 1 -- Circumscription DA – reject the TVA as an attempt to circumscribe and deradicalize the revolutionary potential of our scholarship within the confines of policy action, this is a white move to domesticate our politics in order to evade structural confrontation

\*\*need arg about hail mary of liberalism

#### 2 -- Injecting critical theory into policy making dilutes and resiginfies it to support empire.

Bolton and Minor, 16

(Michael Bolton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Pace University, Elizabeth Minor, Visiting Research Scholar @ Jindal school of international affairs, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12343)

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996). An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006). As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception). According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).

### 2AC -- FW -- AT: SSD

#### 1 -- SSD is a normative practice aimed at transforming students into liberal democratic subjects trained in detaching themselves from ideological opposition to American hegemony and locating the West as the “leader of the free world” – our ev is contextual to debate.

Greene and Hicks ‘05 -- Ronald Walter Greene is an assistant professor working in the department of communication studies at The University of Texas-Austin. His primary research area concerns the work of rhetorical practices in cultural policies and governmental rationalities dedicated to producing particular forms of citizenship; Darrin Hicks is the Professor of Communication Studies and Director of Debate at DU. His teaching and research focuses on collaborative governance, public deliberation and political argumentation. In addition to publishing numerous articles on these topics, he has worked closely with Federal and State agencies, as well as community‐based non‐profits, on issues concerning collaborative governance and its effects on health and education outcomes; Dennis G. Day is the Assistant Professor and Director of Forensics in the Department of Speech at the University of Wisconsin, Madison (Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks, “Lost Convictions: Debate Both Sides and the Ethical Self Fashioning of Liberal Subjects”, originally published in CULTURAL STUDIES; 19.1 (2005): pp. 100-126, accessed 7-5-2022) -- nikki

The practice of debating both sides does not warrant support simply because it is ethical; it does so because it is an effective pedagogical technique for inculcating the communicative ethics necessary for democratic citizenship. According to Day, ‘Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze, and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to a decision. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that ‘‘truthful’’ positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions’ (1966, p. 13). In response to the critics of switch-side debating, who claimed that a process of inquiry and discussion could reap these benefits of an ‘enlarged mentality’ without requiring students to speak out against their convictions, Day claimed that it is only through the publication of others’ views / by virtue of speech / that the habits of mind necessary to attend equally and impartially to all sides of a controversy are formed. In other words, by debating both sides of a question, by giving a forceful presentation of views that contradict her or his commitments, the student learns how to convert her or his personal convictions into a conviction for the political morality of debate itself. By learning how to abstract from her or his particular viewpoint, a skill necessitated by the demands of debating both sides, the student is made amenable to the democratic authority of debate and the norm of full and free expression.9 In this way, debate emerges as a way of knowing how to embody a general norm that, ironically, disguises how the norm emerges from the particular histories and interests of the body (race, nation, gender, class) that speaks. Cold war liberalism and free speech In the hands of Dennis Day, the goal of debate was to reassign the convictions of students to the process of debate as a democratic form of decision-making. In this way debate training was no longer simply a mechanism for developing critical thinking or advocacy skills, but instead, debate was now a performance technique that made possible the self-fashioning of a new form of liberal citizen. The citizen’s commitments were to be redirected to the process of debate. This redirection entails a procedural notion of liberal citizenship that asks the student to invest in debate as a method of deliberation. Our argument here rests on Day’s attempt to ethically defend debating both sides by linking the pedagogical rationale of debate to a public ethic, in this case, full and free expression. We are not claiming that debate actually creates a situation in which students who participate in the activity abandon their convictions and commitments on the issues of the day nor are we claiming that debate asks students to embrace an ungrounded relativism. For us, what is important here is that when faced with an ethical criticism of debating both sides, Day sets out a deliberative-oriented vision of democracy whereby the liberal citizen materializes by divorcing his/her speech from the sincerity principle. To embody one’s commitment to the democratic norm of free and full expression required students to argumentatively perform positions they might personally oppose in order to instantiate the circulation of free and full expression and to secure a commitment toward debate as a democratic form of decision-making. Thus, the debate over debate was a struggle over the ethical attributes required for liberal citizenship. The argument that we will develop in this section begins with the premise that a key element of Cold War liberalism was the attempt to re-position the United States as the leader of the Free World (Greene 1999). One way Cold War liberalism made possible the emergence of US world leadership was by pulling together a national and international commitment to ‘American exceptionalism’. According to Nikhil Pal Singh (1998), American exceptionalism is a product of the attempt to conceptualize the United States as a concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. In so doing, the US is granted a status and history that is deemed unique from other nations at the same time as that uniqueness qualifies the US to be the leader and judge of democratic attributes, characteristics and norms. In the aftermath of World War II, the proliferation of free speech as a characteristic of the US helped to warrant Cold War liberal claims to American exceptionalism. As Paul Passavant (1996) suggests, the ‘Millian paradigm’ of free speech has been appropriated by U.S. constitutional theorists to grant ‘America’ the status of a nation whereby ‘one legitimately claims the right to free speech’ (pp. 301/2). For Passavant, the process by which the US emerged as a nation whereby citizens claim the right to free speech creates a moral geography in which other nations are not granted the ‘maturity’ necessary for free speech and/or simultaneously must conform to the U.S. vision of free speech. It is our argument that during the cold war, the debate-free speech assemblage helped to make possible the emergence of ‘America’s’ status as an exemplar of democracy. The Cold War supported two reasons not to debate, or at least participate in affirming the ‘Red China’ resolution. First, the military academies maintained that they could not argue against established US foreign policy, in particular while donning a military uniform, without committing what Habermas (1979a) calls a ‘performative contradiction’. Moreover, they feared that a cadet arguing for diplomatic recognition of Communist China would send a message of indecisiveness, division, and weakness to the nation’s international enemies (Burns 1954, p. 12). Furthermore, given the on-going hearings to expose communist infiltration in the Army, one might legitimately fear that he might not be granted the privilege to suspend the sincerity principle nor to abstract from the particularity of the uniform he might be wearing at the time of the debate. Second, the teacher colleges of Nebraska, as well as many editorialists, claimed that by defending diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’, students would fall victim to Communist propaganda (Baird 1955, p. 6) Impressionable students, critics feared, would not have the cognitive skills or experience to recognize propaganda and would, thus, be susceptible to indoctrination and brainwashing. As hysterical as this argument sounds / and it certainly was a product of the anti-Communist hysteria wrought by McCarthyism / it was not without academic support. A hallmark of the Cold War liberalism of the late forties and fifties was the steadfast belief in / and fear of / the seductive appeal of totalitarianism for American youth. In 1949, in his Cold War liberal manifesto The Vital Center, the influential historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr, argued that the lack of political commitment and moral conviction among the US citizenry, in particular American youth, posed a considerable threat to the continued existence of democracy. Schlesinger (1949) and other Cold War liberals (and conservatives) feared that an alienated youth was especially vulnerable to the promises of certitude and solidarity contained in Communist propaganda. Communism held a genuine appeal for those stricken with anxiety because it offered both new social forms and a new social creed. US political culture, in contrast, was simply too thin to provide a defense against the persistent neuroses of postindustrial modernity and, therefore, was in grave danger of Communist infiltration. Because ‘[t] here is a Hitler and Stalin in the breast of every man [sic]’, Schlesinger proclaimed, the fate of free society hinged upon the prospects for cultivating a youth dedicated to keeping constant vigil over the strength of their own and their fellow citizens convictions (p. 250). Concurrently, the Army Information and Education Group, which would become the core of the Hovland-Yale Communication and Persuasion Group, led by Carl Hovland, was conducting experiments testing the relationship between inducement and internalized attitude change. In 1953, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley published their highly influential book Communication and Persuasion, which established a positive relation between verbalization and the intensification of belief and predicted that being forced to overtly defend a position discrepant from one’s own private beliefs would result in the internalization of the overtly defended position.10 This prediction was further supported by the forced-compliance and cognitive dissonance studies of Festinger (1957) and his colleagues at Stanford. For decades, the ability to understand the merits of opposing arguments had been championed as one of the prime pedagogical benefits of intercollegiate debate training. However, in the fall of 1954, Hovland’s and Festinger’s studies coupled with the antiCommunist rhetoric of Schlesinger, which would, much to Schlesinger’s dismay, come to underwrite McCarthy’s witch hunts, would be articulated in such a way that debate’s ability to train students to take the other’s perspective might be framed as a threat to national security. The fear that defending the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ would turn American youth into Communist sympathizers saturated the debating both sides controversy with an anxiety over the virility of ‘democratic faith’.11 Those choosing to defend the virtues of intercollegiate debate and the practice of debating both sides were careful not to question the basic tenets of the antiCommunism that constituted the ideological core of Cold War liberalism. Democracy, if it were to survive the seductive appeal of totalitarianism, had to become a fighting faith, a faith born out of and tested in social and political conflict. Debate, in particular the format of debating both sides of controversial issues embodied the sort of political conflict that could engender sound conviction, rational decisions, and a committed youth impervious to Communist propaganda.12 Moreover, debate provided the antidote to communist propaganda. Baird concluded, ‘[c]ollege debate teams are the last groups in this nation where Communist propaganda has any chance of making headway’ (1955, p. 7). No student wishing to win the debate, Burns argued, ‘would take the affirmative on the grounds that we must love the Chinese or that they are merely agrarian radicals’ (p. 7). Burns, so confident in the antiCommunist sentiment of the majority of students, contended that no student would dare argue in favour of Communism but ‘pitch his [sic] case on the argument that recognition might help pull China out of the Moscow orbit, that it might help build a firmer anti-Communist alliance, that it might make peaceful coexistence possible. He [sic] would, in short, be directing our attention to the very questions that all American’s might well be debating’ (p. 7). For Schlesinger, however, the ground of the anti-Communist consensus Baird believed to be evident in ‘the majority of students’ was unstable. Schlesinger performed a delicate balancing act in The Vital Center, disavowing the ‘guilt by association’ reasoning of the House Un-American Activities Committee while advocating that the Communist Party represented a ‘clear and present danger’ to the national security of the United States. One way to create the necessary faith in democracy was, for Schlesinger, to defend free expression as a democratic norm worth fighting for because ‘free discussion [is the] climate ... democracy requires for responsible decision’ (1949, p. 203). For Schlesinger, the democratic faith necessitated full and free discussion, a fundamental civil liberty that provided, in his words, a ‘technique of freedom’ (p. 189). It was ‘the climate of freedom’ preserved by the democratic method of free speech that authorized his ‘conviction that a free people will never vote for totalitarianism’ (p. 199). Nikhil Pal Singh (1998) argues that to understand the stark opposition between liberal democracy and totalitarianism permeating Cold War discourse requires an appreciation of how the US asserted its moral claim to be the ‘leader of the free world’. Of particular importance in this process was, according to Singh, ‘the widely held argument that the United States is the world’s exemplary nation-state, already the bearer of universality within itself’ (p. 490). The discourse of American exceptionalism is advanced in and through this description of the US as the concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. Singh supports his claim and discusses its implications by focusing on the historical intersection between the Cold War and Jim Crow. To defend the United States as the exemplar of universality required the fight against Jim Crow in order to better project Cold War liberalism’s moral claim to world leadership in the battle with Communism. From this perspective, the fight against Jim Crow, as Manning Marable (1984) argues, was inextricably linked to the global requirements of US world power. For Singh, Marable’s insight becomes the starting point for supporting his claim that Cold War liberalism’s promotion of democratic norms both domestically and globally was held together by the construction of ‘America’ as the container and advocate of universal democratic norms. This concept of American exceptionalism was made possible by the transformation of the United States into the ‘concrete universal’ embodiment of democracy. Singh’s reading of how civil rights worked to promote American exceptionalism suggests a model for thinking about the the norm of free speech during the Cold War. For Schlesinger, civil liberties and civil rights emerged as the two techniques of freedom. Schlesinger writes ‘in the world under the shadow of the police state, we only strengthen our claim to moral leadership by creating here an environment for free and responsible discussion’ (1949, p. 218). It is Schlesinger’s ability to use the domestic need of free speech in the United States as a moral claim to world leadership that gives the United States the ability to embrace a faith in its role as the telos and exemplar of democracy. Singh’s revisionist history and Schlesinger’s Cold War liberal advocacy of free speech suggest that we consider the debating both sides controversy during the 1950s and 1960s beyond its parochial frame as debate pedagogy and, instead, as a full-fledged element in a complex transformation in liberal citizenship necessitated by the emergence of the US as a global super power. In Baird’s hands, the interaction between the Cold War and debating both sides offers a close correspondence between the function of rhetorical education and the needs of Cold War liberalism to generate an antiCommunist consensus. It does so in two ways: First, it gives students the reasoning skills necessary to make the shadowy propaganda of Communism transparent. Second, due to the competitive character of the activity, students are not likely to argue for Communism, and, therefore, they are not opening themselves up to the risks of being captured by its dangerous seductions. Ten years later, Day (1966) would argue that ‘the ethics of democratic debate do not allow for a pre-judgment of the reasonableness of discourse’ (p. 12) and he demonstrated a deep faith in the power of debate to serve as a means of democratic decision making by promoting speech against the grain of the reigning consensus. Day expressed a more radical possibility of debate and argument as providing the ethical resources for rooting out error, generating consensus, and providing a universal norm of democracy. Day also demonstrated his commitment to free speech more radically than Schlesinger by abandoning Schlesinger’s deployment of ‘clear and present danger’ as an external value to regulate the reasonableness of speech. Yet, Day’s defence of debating both sides elides the national particularity of how free speech was being put to work in the global struggle between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. One way that Cold War liberalism helped to transform the national particularity of the United States into a universal form of liberalism was through the constitution of free speech as a democratic norm. As a cultural technology debating both sides contributed to American exceptionalism by transforming students into the concrete embodied performers of the universal norms of free speech. In other words, by instantiating a desire for full and free expression, the pedagogical technique of debating both sides became a mechanism by which the student-debater-citizen becomes an exceptional ‘American’ / the bearer of universal norms of liberal democracy.

## 2AC -- K -- Capitalism

### 2AC -- Perm

#### 1 -- Perm do both – solves their offense – they haven’t proven mutual exclusivity – there’s no reason why our theories of power aren’t co-constitutive

#### 2 -- Perm do each – revolutionary strategies do not have to operate on the same levels or involve the same people – the Ks engagement in material revolution against the capitalist state doesn’t trade off with the 1AC strategy of storytelling and counter-histories – lack of interaction disproves competition

#### 3 -- Perm do the aff and the alt in all other instances

#### 4 -- Perm do the aff and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt

#### Two net benefits to the perm –

#### 1 -- Cotheorization DA – theorizing capitalism and colonial conquest together informs a historically material mode of refusal and grounds the movements of the neg in legacies of dispossessive violence that formed the foundation for the racial capitalist regime of NATO and resulted in the promotion of capitalist exploitation throughout the world – there is additive value in including the aff’s focus on colonial violence

#### 2 -- Invisibility DA – how do you fight what you cannot see ? how do you strategize against an enemy you do not know exists ? our methodology of counter-historical storytelling is a prerequisite to the success of the revolution – decolonization of our subjective engagement with institutions like NATO on the level of research praxes informs material advocacy by reframing our knowledge of NATO to call attention to unseen violence

### 1AR -- AT: No Perms

#### We get perms in a methods debate –

#### 1 -- Method interaction -- resistance does not occur alone but in conjunction with other strategies – perms allow for productive analysis of resistance by allowing debaters to combine tactics to maximize revolutionary efficacy

#### 2 -- Real world -- advocacy outside of debate never happens in a vacuum or in total isolation – uniting movements around common goals builds broad coalitional support for the destruction of dominant sysems and ideologies – only our interpretation trains debaters to export their skills and become effective advocates for change

#### 3 -- Rejoinder -- method v method debates teach us to hone in on the unique benefits of our advocacies and test their comparative solvency and utility – if your method does not compete you have not disproved the validity of the aff and you should lose

#### 4 -- Plan plus -- their interpretation permits method-plus counter-advocacies like “do the aff and reject ableism” which skirts every discussion of the aff and precludes the refinement of decolonial strategy – shifting the frame of debate is a form of colonial erasure

### 2AC -- Alt

#### 1 -- White Marxism DA – the alternative is complicit in exclusionary white marxism that evades analyses of race and totalizes structural colonial antagonisms – they force indigenous/African activists to leave their identities at the door and make their advocacies commensurable with a structured form of whitewashed institutional engagement or get the fuck out of the revolution – they are in a double bind – either 1) they concede the link turn and the k is terminally non-competitive or 2) they exclude non-institutional rhetorical strategies like storytelling from their model of resistance and bracket out discussions of colonial violence

#### 2 -- Purity Politics DA – their move to exclude black/indigenous scholars and activists from the alternative is a form of psychological hostility that brackets out discussions of identity and renders black/indigenous embodied and lived advocacy disposable in order to preserve a false notion of movement unity – results in a vertical party structure in which white people are on top and black/native people are at the bottom which internal link turns their ability to solve any of their offense

#### 3 -- Institutional Progressivism DA – their usage of material fiat relapses into the utopian imagination of the West – the assumption that forward progress can remedy and erase the deterministic effect of historical trauma and violence is wrong – Marxist movements rely on a liberal notion of time that conceptualizes history as a linear march towards a unified ideal of liberation – this erases instances of colonial violence that disrupt their vision of progress.

Winters ’16 -- Joseph Winters is the Alexander F. Hehmeyer Associate Professor of Religious Studies and African and African American Studies. He also holds secondary positions in English and Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies. His interests lie at the intersection of black religious thought, African-American literature, and critical theory (Joseph R. Winters, 2016, “Hope Draped in Black: Race Melancholy, and the Agony of Progress”, Duke University Press, ISBN: 978-0-8223-6173-2, accessed 6-29-2021) -- nikki

Other literary figures of the twentieth century, including Ralph Ellison, exposed the limitations, dangers, and erasures of forward-marching schemes. In his celebrated novel Invisible Man, Ellison offers a kind of parody of Hegelian and Marxist-inspired conceptions of time and history. The Brotherhood, an interracial, liberationist group that the protagonist joins and later clashes with in the novel, tends to view the past and present in a narrowly instrumental way. According to this organization, past events, struggles, and losses are only significant insofar as they contribute to and help fulfill the goal of human liberation. Those individuals, strivings, and memories that are not immediately relevant to this liberated future, or that Introduction 11 present an obstacle to a unified, harmonious future, are “plunged outside of history.” While Ellison insists that the Brotherhood does not represent Marxism per se, some of the qualities associated with the fictional organization remind us of the dangers of Marxism and Marxist interpretations of history and human experience. Recall that Marx, Hegel’s dissident disciple, is very aware of the ambivalences at the center of modern life. While Marx occasionally lauds capitalism for the new, valuable things and ideas that it brings into the world—novel forms of communication, travel, commerce, knowledge—he claims that advancements in these areas depend on the global exploitation of workers, the unequal distribution of wealth, and the objectification of human relationships.22 Although Marx is primarily concerned with class struggle, he is aware that class and race domination are intertwined. The wealth that European capitalists have been able to accumulate, on Marx’s reading, is made possible by the exploitation and enslavement of Africans, Asians, and Native Americans as well as the usurpation of indigenous lands.23 The “rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production” contains a dark underside; progress is a turbulent movement.24 Even though Marx acknowledges the ambivalence of progress, he remains committed to the idea that history moves, through struggle and conflict, toward a better and more humane future. Capitalism is a penultimate historical stage, a stage that anticipates and enables the workers’ revolution and the gradual creation of a classless society, the telos of history. Marx envisions a future society no longer beset by exploitation, inequality, and division. Although this seems on the surface to be a laudable vision, Marx’s forward-directed proposal contains notable problems and flaws. The belief that history moves toward one goal trivializes the presence of multiple and conflicting aims, desires, meanings, pasts, and comprehensive visions within our world. This denial of plurality has pernicious consequences. As the legacy of communist regimes demonstrates, the imposition of a universal telos (by the so-called vanguards of history) onto local contexts and communities is a violent process, a process that sacrifices—for the sake of a unified and liberated future—those bodies, cultures, and groups that “lag behind” and resist the movement of history.25 Therefore Marx’s proposal runs into some of the same problems that Hegel’s account of history does. In addition, because Marx privileges class identity and the labor struggle, other kinds of struggles—around race and gender, for instance—are either rendered insignificant or seen as ancillary to class conflict. In chapter 3, I discuss how Ellison challenges Marxist conceptions of time and history by offering a jazz-inspired notion of time and by demonstrating the playful, tension-filled relationship between the past and present.

even when we think everything is digital geography still matters – most intentse interventions are still close to border, info ops happen mostly in further states

cyber disruptuiions

nato states vs non-nato states – in non-nato states they only do info ops and cyber disruption – grey zone conflict – russia is most likely to continue doing conflicsshort of war against nato states or non-nato states far from their border, nato has sucessfully deterred russia, they have convinced russia that a high magnitude attack will merit a response wo russia is testing low levels of conflict because they wont retaliate in kind, the jury is still out over how the west will or should respond to grey zone provocation – us/russia does cyber disruptions and they stay in a frozen conflcicy, russia does cyber disruption and west escalates military and then theres a question of what they do, russia would likely back down, or they coulde scalate further, third cases is that west does not respond which would cause an impact – these thons are ot military – cyber disruption ca effect the grid and create economic costs, election interference matters for eastern european countries, paramilitary ops could affect refugees or civil conflicts, create ethnic conflicy

alex smt

kimberly martin

### 2AC -- Root Cause

#### Racism is the root cause of domination; capitalism stemmed from it.

Johnson ‘83 (Cedric J. Johnson, “Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition,” <https://libcom.org/files/Black%20Marxism-Cedric%20J.%20Robinson.pdf>, 1983)

With each historical moment, however, the rationale and cultural mechanisms of domination became more transparent. Race was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power. Aristotle, one of the most original aristocratic apologists, had provided the template in Natural Law. In inferiorizing women ("[TI he deliberative faculty of the soul is not present at all in the slave; in a female it is present but ineffective" [Politics, i26oaiz]), non-Greeks, and all laborers (slaves, artisans, farmers, wage workers, etc.: "[Tlhe mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts" [Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b20]), Aristotle had articulated an uncompromising racial construct. And from the twelfth century on, one European ruling order after another, one cohort of clerical or secular propagandists following another, reiterated and embellished this racial calculus. As the Black Radical Tradition was distilled from the racial antagonisms which were arrayed along a continuum from the casual insult to the most ruthless and lethal rules of law; from the objectifications of entries in marine cargo manifests, auction accountancy, plantation records, broadsheets and newspapers; from the loftiness of Christian pulpits and biblical exegesis to the minutia of slave-naming, dress, types of food, and a legion of other significations, the terrible culture of race was revealed. Inevitably, the tradition was transformed into a radical force. And in its most militant manifestation, no longer accustomed to the resolution that flight and withdrawal were sufficient, the purpose of the struggles informed by the tradition became the overthrow of the whole race-based structure.

#### Racism is the root cause of capitalism, and violence. History proves that the White states always wanted to dominate black people and since they could never be finished they constructed capitalistic hierarchies.

Johnson ‘83 (Cedric J. Johnson, “Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition,” <https://libcom.org/files/Black%20Marxism-Cedric%20J.%20Robinson.pdf>, 1983)

The functions of these latter ideological constructions were related but different. Race was largely the rationalization for the domination, exploitation, and/or extermination of non-"Europeans" (including Slavs and Jews). And we shall have occasion in Part 2 to explore its applications beyond Europe and particularly to African peoples more closely. But while we remain on European soil, it is Herrenvolkthat matters. In eighteenth-century England, Reginald Horsman sees its beginnings in the "mythical" Anglo-Saxonism that was flown as an ideological pennant by the Whig intelligentsia in France (for example, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras and Montesquieu, and before them Franqois Hotman and Count Henri de Boulainvilliers), in Germany (Herder, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel), in north America (John Adams and Thomas Jefferson),  ideologists displayed the idea of the heroic Germanic race. And the idea swept through nineteenth-century Europe, gathering momentum and artifice through such effects as Sir Walter Scott's historical novels and Friedrich von Schlegel's philological fables. Inevitably, of course, the idea was dressed in the accoutrement of nineteenth-century European science. “Not satisfied with merely proclaiming the superiority of the white over the coloured race, also felt it necessary to erect a hierarchy within the white race itself.”

#### Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism — NATO’s an organization built for sustaining monopoly capitalism, a process that endlessly expands and divides territory for the market expansion.

Cheng Enfu and Lu Baolin 21, Enfu, Professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Baolin, writer, 5-1-2021, "Five Characteristics of Neoimperialism," https://monthlyreview.org/2021/05/01/five-characteristics-of-neoimperialism/, jy

The New Monopoly of the International Oligarchic Alliance

Lenin stated in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism that “the epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the “struggle for spheres of influence.”31 Finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Two main groups of countries—those owning colonies and colonies themselves—are typical of this epoch, as are the diverse forms of dependent countries that, politically, are formally independent, but in fact are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.32 Nowadays, neoimperialism has formed new alliances and hegemonic relations in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields.

Within the context of the new monopoly of the international oligarchs, the fourth characteristic of neoimperialism is the formation of an international monopoly capitalist alliance between one hegemon and several other great powers. An economic foundation consisting of money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats has been formed for them to exploit and oppress via monopoly both at home and abroad.

The G7 as the Mainstay of the Imperial Capitalist Core

Neoimperialism’s current international monopoly economic alliance and the framework of global economic governance are both dominated by the United States. The G6 group was formed in 1975 by six leading industrial countries, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy, and became G7 when Canada joined the following year. G7 and its monopoly organizations are the coordination platforms, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization are the functional bodies. The global order of economic governance that was set up under the Bretton Woods system after the Second World War is essentially a high-level international capitalist monopoly alliance manipulated by the United States to serve its strategic economic and political interests. In the early 1970s, the U.S. dollar was decoupled from gold and the Bretton Woods currency system collapsed. One after another, summits of the G7 countries then shouldered responsibility for strengthening the Western consensus, contending against the socialist countries of the East, and boycotting the demands made by the less developed countries of the South for reforms to the international economic and political order.33 Since neoliberalism became the set of concepts dominating global economic governance, these multilateral institutions and platforms have become the driving force for the expansion of neoliberalism throughout the world. In line with the wishes of the international financial monopoly oligarchy and its allies, these bodies spare no effort to induce the developing countries to implement financial liberalization, the privatization of production factors, marketization without prior supervision, and free exchange in capital projects so as to facilitate inward and outward flows of international “hot money.” These institutions are constantly ready to control and plunder the economies of developing countries, extracting huge profits by encouraging speculation and creating financial bubbles. As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in The Grand Chessboard, “the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can be said to represent ‘global’ interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated.”34

Since the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank have lured developing countries to implement neoliberal reforms. When these countries have fallen into crisis because of privatization and financial liberalization, the IMF and other institutions have forced them to accept the Washington Consensus by adding various unreasonable conditions to loans provided earlier. The effect is to further intensify the impacts of neoliberal reform. Between 1978 and 1992, more than seventy developing countries or former socialist countries implemented a total of 566 structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.35 In the early 1980s, for example, the IMF used the Latin American debt crisis to force Latin American countries to accept neoliberal “reforms.” In order to curb inflation, the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1979 pushed short-term interest rates up from 10 percent to 15 percent, and finally to more than 20 percent. Because the existing debt of the developing countries was linked to U.S. interest rates, every 1 percent rise in U.S. interest rates would result in developing-world debtor countries paying an additional $40 to 50 billion per year in interest. In the second half of 1981, Latin America was borrowing at the rate of $1 billion a week, mostly in order to pay the interest on existing debt. During 1983, interest payments consumed almost half of Latin American export earnings.36 Under pressure to repay their loans, Latin American countries were forced to accept neoliberal reform plans initiated by the IMF. The main content of these plans consisted of privatizing state-owned enterprises; liberalizing trade finance; implementing economic austerity policies, with the effect of reducing living standards; cutting the taxes on monopoly enterprises; and reducing government spending on social infrastructure. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the IMF attached numerous conditions to assistance provided to South Korea, including that the allowance for foreign shareholdings be relaxed from 23 percent to 50 percent, and then to 55 percent by December 1998. Moreover, South Korea was required to allow foreign banks to set up branches freely.37

NATO and the International Monopoly-Capitalist Military and Political Alliance

Established in the early days of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international military alliance for the defense of monopoly capitalism. It is led by the United States and involves other imperialist countries. During the Cold War, NATO was the main tool used by the United States to actively contain and counter the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as to influence and control the Western European countries. At the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved and NATO became the military organization through which the United States sought to achieve its strategic goals on a global level. A capitalist military oligopoly, involving one hegemon and several other great powers, had come into being. Former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher stated: “Only the United States can act as a leader.… For the United States to exercise leadership requires us to own a credible force threat as a backup for diplomacy.”38 The National Security Strategy for the New Century, published in the United States in December 1998, claimed unambiguously that the goal of the United States was to “lead the entire world” and that no challenge to its leadership, from any country or group of countries, would ever be allowed to come into being.39 On December 4, 2018, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo declared in a speech to the Marshall Fund in Brussels: “The United States has not given up its global leadership. It reshaped the order after WWII based on sovereignty but not the multilateral system.… Under President Trump’s leadership, we will not give up international leadership or our allies in the international system.… Trump is recovering America’s traditional status as the world center and leadership.… The United States wants to lead the world, now and always.”40

To achieve leadership and domination over the world, the United States has made every effort to promote NATO’s eastward expansion, and has expanded its own sphere of influence to control Central and Eastern Europe and to compress Russia’s strategic space. Under the control of the United States, NATO has become an ideal military tool for U.S. global interests. In March 1999, a multinational NATO force led by the United States launched a large-scale air attack on Yugoslavia. It was the first time that NATO had launched a military strike against a sovereign country during the fifty years since its foundation. In April 1999, NATO held a summit meeting in Washington, formally adopting a strategic concept that can be summarized under two points. First, NATO was permitted to conduct collective military intervention outside its defense area in response to “crimes and conflicts involving common interests.” This effectively changed NATO from a “collective defense” military alliance into an offensive political and military organization with the so-called purpose of defending common interests and shared values. Second, NATO’s military actions did not require authorization from the UN Security Council.41

In addition to NATO, U.S. military alliances formed on the basis of bilateral treaties include pacts with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. There are U.S. military bases on the territory of all its military allies, and these comprise a major part of the neoimperialist military alliance. The United States and its allies make military threats and carry out provocations in many regions of the world, resulting in many “hot wars,” “warm wars,” “cool wars,” and “new cold wars,” intensifying the new arms race. The acts of “state terrorism” carried out by neoimperialism, and the double standard it applies to counter-terrorism, have caused other forms of terrorism to multiply.

#### Colonial relations of domination and expropriation formed the foundation for the rise of capitalism – prefer the aff’s explanatory power.

Ulas ’18 -- (Onur Ulas, 2018, "Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism," Oxford University Press, https://www.academia.edu/7895500/Colonial\_Capitalism\_and\_the\_Dilemmas\_of\_Liberalism\_ToC\_Introduction\_Oxford\_University\_Press\_2018\_, accessed 7-11-2022) -- nikki

This book attempts to address these limits by “rematerializing” the relationship between liberalism and empire. The task involves complementing an account of the semantic context of liberal ideas with an analysis of the socioeconomic context, that is, paying as much attention to the institutional structures and economic practices that constituted the fabric of empire as to the political languages and vocabularies in which liberal intellectuals articulated their assessment of it. There are no doubt multiple ways of rematerializing the imperial context (e.g., gender, ecology, technology, law, governance), each of which would highlight a different aspect of empire’s formative impact on liberal thought. I propose viewing the materiality of empire specifically through the lens of “colonial capitalism,” a notion inspired by critical social theory and colonial political economy. As an analytic framework, colonial capitalism rests on the fundamental premise that capitalism has historically emerged within the juridico-political framework of the “colonial empire” rather than the “nation-state.” It grasps capitalist relations as having developed in and through colonial networks of commodities, peoples, ideas, and practices, which formed a planetary web of value chains connecting multiple and heterogeneous sites of production across oceanic distances. A major corollary of the colonial perspective on capitalism is to underscore the constitutive role of extra-economic coercion in effecting capitalist social transformations. Within this picture, colonial land grabs, plantation slavery, and the forced deindustrialization of imperial dependencies configure as crucial moments in the global formation of capitalism.10 Borrowing a key concept from Marx’s account of the origins of capitalism, I employ the term colonial primitive accumulation to theorize the forcible transformation and uneven integration of colonial land, labor, and resources into global networks of capital.11 My focus falls on colonial sites, not because primitive accumulation did not also transpire in Europe, but because it played out much more brutally at the imperial frontiers, called for different frameworks of justification, and exercised liberal metropolitan minds with more vexing questions. The principal contribution of this framework to the study of liberalism is to highlight the economic undertakings of colonial entrepreneurs as a type of colonial anomaly that had to be accounted for by the liberal standards of metropolitan thought. The optic of colonial capitalism redefines empire’s challenge to liberalism by shifting the focus from who the colonized are to what the colonizers do, that is, from the cultural difference of the subject populations to the deeds of imperial agents themselves. In charting a new map of the liberalism-empire nexus, I mainly follow metropolitan reflections on territorial conquest, indigenous dispossession, bonded labor, and armed trading, rather than judgments about the rational capacity or civilizational status of the non-Europeans. For sharpening the contours of this problem, the study capitalizes on the peculiarity of the British imperial ideology. Although the British matched and eventually surpassed their European rivals in the capacity and readiness for imperial warfare, conquest, and brutality, they stubbornly believed themselves to be, in David Armitage’s classic formulation, a “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free” people.12 The clash of this commercial, pacific, and free self-image with the ruthless expropriation and despotic coercion of colonial economies offers a window onto the tension between the liberal conceptions of capitalism and its illiberal conditions of emergence and possibility. Cognizant of the notoriously protean character of the term “liberalism,” I purposely restrict the investigation of liberalism to its instantiations in metropolitan theories of capitalism rather than taking on the entire range of family resemblances associated with the term.13 I identify the primal norms of contractual freedom and juridical equality as the ideational core of the liberal conception of capitalism. While freedom and equality as normative values are most commonly associated with liberal political theory, they were also, and perhaps more systematically, elaborated and enshrined in the language of classical political economy. Originating in the seventeenth century, political economy as a field of knowledge evolved in tandem with global capitalism, and its practitioners often proclaimed it to be the appropriate medium for explaining the dynamics of commerce and capital, as well as for charting an enlightened course of domestic and imperial policy.14 By concentrating on political economy, this book therefore anchors core tenets of liberalism in a sphere of reflection that adopted capitalist social forms and their global variegation as its principle object of inquiry. I dissect the entangled histories of liberalism, capitalism, and empire around three critical moments of imperial expansion and controversy in which the theoretical parameters of liberalism were articulated. The first of these is the seventeenth-century colonial land appropriation in the Americas that enabled the formation of Atlantic colonial capitalism and ignited momentous European debates over legitimate claims to property in the New World. The second moment centers on the East India Company’s ascendancy in Bengal and British merchant capital’s intrusion into the Indian economy, which triggered a public storm about the nature of Anglo-Indian trade. The third and final moment concerns nineteenth-century schemes of imperial labor allocation that aimed to promote colonial emigration and settler capitalism in Australasia, which threw into question the legal and economic boundaries between free and bonded labor. “Property,” “exchange,” and “labor” thereby constitute a triadic constellation at the core of liberal political economy’s encounter with colonial capitalism. Extralegal appropriation of land in America, militarized trading in India, and elaborate schemes of dependent labor in Australasia each represents a vital moment in the development of global capital networks and a challenge to narrating this development as the triumph of private property, market exchange, and free labor. Corresponding to the central questions of property, exchange, and labor, I analyze the theoretical attempts of Locke, Burke, and Wakefield to reconcile the essentially liberal image of Britain’s capitalist economy with the illiberal institutional arrangements and practices on which it stood. My specific focus on these three intellectuals stems from their simultaneous commitment to a modern capitalist economy, to imperial expansion as an instrument of economic prosperity and political power, and to the primal liberal norms of contractual freedom and juridical equality. These multiple and often incongruent theoretical commitments render their writings privileged ground for detecting the frictions between liberalism, capitalism, and empire and their negotiation in the register of political economy. Compounding this rationale is the active involvement of the three thinkers in Britain’s imperial politics: Locke as Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations and later a member of the Board of Trade; Burke as a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee on India; Wakefield as a pro-colonization publicist, lobbyist, and the intellectual leader of the Colonial Reform Movement. Their shared institutional and intellectual investments in the colonial capitalist enterprise and the empire of liberty furnishes the overarching framework within which a comparison of these otherwise dissimilar thinkers can generate unexpected insights into the liaisons between liberalism and empire. The following chapters demonstrate that when compared to the twenty-firstcentury reclamations of British imperialism as the vanguard of economic globalization, Locke, Burke, and Wakefield were ironically less self-assured about the coercive interventions that went into making Britain’s imperial economy. Their disquiet about the illiberality of empire was reflected in their strategies of “disavowal.” Crucially, none of them denied the fact of indigenous dispossession, unequal exchange, and labor bondage that pervaded colonial economies. Instead of joining contemporary critics in denouncing the imperial system, however, they resorted to theoretical maneuvers, rhetorical strategies, fictions, and myths that insulated the liberal image of Britain’s commercial economy from the enormities of colonial ventures. These theoretical innovations include Locke’s myth of mankind’s “universal consent” to the use of money, which ultimately blamed Native Americans for their own expropriation; Burke’s fantasy of “imperial commerce” that promised equitable economic dealings between the British and their conquered Indian subjects; and Wakefield’s fictive “settler contract” whereby poor colonial immigrants acceded to work as wage laborers rather than become independent landowners. Such efforts at reconciliation also set these three thinkers apart from other political economists, like Adam Smith and David Hume, for whom the empire, particularly in its territorial and extractive variety, was nigh irredeemable from a liberal economic perspective. When the liberal British self-image traveled overseas, it crashed against the violent shores of colonial capitalism. It fell to the liberal intellectuals of the empire, such as the three examined here, to brace the hull.

#### Imperialism and capitalism are symbiotic frames of analysis – capitalist accumulation is not purely economic but rather shaped by the social forces of colonial expropriation.

Ulas ’18 -- (Onur Ulas, 2018, "Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism," Oxford University Press, https://www.academia.edu/7895500/Colonial\_Capitalism\_and\_the\_Dilemmas\_of\_Liberalism\_ToC\_Introduction\_Oxford\_University\_Press\_2018\_, accessed 7-11-2022) -- nikki

Social historians of imperial and transoceanic connections have long underscored the historical symbiosis between imperialism and capitalist expansion. Robin Blackburn, in his magisterial history of the New World slavery, describes the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Atlantic as the stage of “pioneering capitalist industrialization.” Commercial wars, territorial conquests, slave trade, and the union of extra-economic coercion and export-oriented production in slave plantations placed these activities “entirely within that sphere of primitive accumulation about which Marx wrote . . . force as an economic power.”32 Turning from the West to the East Indies, we find an aggressive form of what Jairus Banaji calls “company capitalism.” This species of mercantile capitalism, prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, combined militarized trading by chartered companies in the Indian Ocean with their forcible intrusion into the organization of agriculture and manufacturing in South Asia, especially after the British military and political ascendancy on the subcontinent.33 Cautioning against overemphasizing commercial imperialism, the recent revival in the area of settler colonial studies has alerted us to the cascades of displacement and depopulation that passed over North America and Australasia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, supplying the “ghost acres” that proved essential to capitalist expansion.34 Finally, Sven Beckert’s recent reconstruction of the Industrial Revolution weaves together these strands of imperial violence, planetary economic reorganization, and institutional innovation into an account of a “war capitalism” that rampaged between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Although Beckert rarely invokes Marx, his story of war capitalism is almost entirely coextensive with Marx’s story of primitive accumulation,35 above all in its focus on the “transformative powers of a union of capital and state power” as the propulsive force behind “imperial expansion, expropriation, and slavery [that] became central to forging a new global economic order and eventually the rise of capitalism.”36 There are two reasons for adopting the concept of primitive accumulation in the study of colonial capitalism and liberalism. The first is the pivotal role it assigns to extra-economic coercion in the creation and maintenance of the institutional background conditions of capitalism.37 As a number of theorists have recently pointed out, capitalism is much more than simply an economic system of production, circulation, and consumption. It consists of an entire “institutionalized social order,” a historically determinate mode of imagining, organizing, and practicing human beings’ relationship to one another and to the nonhuman world, which encompasses social, ecological, and political dimensions at both the macro-level of institutional-ideological complexes and the micro-level of subjectivities.38 That being said, the perceived autonomy of the “economic” relations institutionalized via self-regulating markets is critical for the liberal imagination of capitalism. As I will dwell on in more detail, liberal theories of capitalism normatively exclude nonmarket coercion from economic dealings between legally free and equal property-owning individuals, even as it consigns such coercion to the enforcement of property rights and contracts. To this extent, capitalism can be extolled as the economic system of freedom par excellence, an identification that finds vernacular expression in the phrase “free market economy” in today’s parlance, and whose genealogy can be traced at least back to Smith’s idea of the “system of perfect liberty.”39 By contrast, Marx, in his discussion of primitive accumulation, stressed that the creation of capitalist relations hinged on the employment of “the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society.”40 Rosa Luxemburg expanded on this by observing extra-economic force to be a “permanent weapon” of capital at every moment of its history, on the grounds that it “is an illusion to hope that capitalism will ever be content with the means of production which it can acquire by commodity exchange.”41 The main vector of coercive capitalist transformation, according to the MarxLuxemburg line, is “expropriation,” which sets the conditions of capitalist “exploitation” by instituting capitalist private property, a dispossessed labor force, and a market in productive inputs and wage goods. Expropriation in this sense is not a simple transfer of resources or “stockpiling.” It denotes a structural transformation, or the “capitalization of social reproduction,” which makes laborers’ access to conditions of labor and means of subsistence contingent on producing a surplus that can be privately appropriated and accumulated as capital.42 Nancy Fraser captures this point well when she writes that the move “from the frontstory of exploitation to the back-story of expropriation constitutes a major epistemic shift” by directing our attention beyond the market (sphere of circulation) and the workplace (sphere of production) to the “political conditions of possibility of capitalism” (sphere of institution).43 Chief among these political conditions is the role of public authority in suppressing the “resistance to the expropriations through which capitalist property relations were originated and sustained.”44 This emphasis on the constitutive violence of primitive accumulation is not intended to displace or occlude other illiberal forms of power and force that are internal to the general law of capitalist accumulation, the most important of which is what Marx famously called the “despotism of the workplace.” Instead, one can fruitfully construe the despotism of the workplace as resting on the institutionalized structural inequality and unfreedom created by primitive accumulation. If the accumulation of capital, as Marx argued, depends on the subjection of social reproduction to the law of value—that is, the generalization of commodity form and the domination of abstract labor in the satisfaction of social needs—then the law of value itself presupposes, in Werner Bonefeld’s words, “the law of private property that primitive accumulation established.”45 It is important to note that abstract labor and the law of value that it subtends are always already organized through historically specific and varying forms instead of manifesting themselves in a singular and uniform social configuration.46 Historically, the entwinement of political power and capital accumulation occasioned different property institutions, exchange systems, and labor regimes in the imperial metropole and in the colonies. In the former, institutionalized political power assumed the form of an interventionist “fiscal-military state” that secured capitalist private property, safeguarded returns to investment, enforced contracts, and protected domestic industries from foreign competition.47 Elsewhere, it functioned as a “colonial state” that upheld titles to expropriated land and enslaved labor, lent military and financial support to chartered companies, reined in unruly subjects overseas, and, of course, waged imperial wars against European and non-European rivals.48 If one follows the thread that runs through the Atlantic slave-plantation complex, the deindustrialization and agrarianization of India, and the opening up of the Chinese markets, one eventually arrives at the imperial state, whose sovereign power circulated, grew, and ramified in an imperial constitution that connected the metropole and its colonial officials to chartered companies, trading factories, settler societies, and plantocracies.49 Secondly, the Marxian notion of primitive accumulation enables us to conceive of violent socioeconomic transformations in the colonies as capitalist transformations, rather than developments that are anomalous or incidental to the history of global capitalism.50 The dismissal of the relevance of colonialism to a theory of capitalism has come in many disciplinary shapes and colors, yet in one way or another, they all flow into the metanarrative of endogenous capitalist development in Europe and the rise of the West.51 Those who call this Eurocentric standpoint into question have linked colonialism to global capitalism in its capacity to “confiscate and conscript” land and labor into circuits of capital, thereby overcoming resource constraints that might have stifled capitalist expansion.52 Perhaps more importantly than this crude material aspect, colonial economic spaces also functioned as spaces for imagining and implementing new ways of organizing social production for profit, at times by means so brutal that they would have been difficult to imagine and let alone attempt in Europe— genocidal expropriation of native populations and chattel slavery being the most obvious examples. In the words of two Atlantic historians, “[C]olonization itself was an experiment in economics on a transoceanic scale . . . it did act as a crucible in which economic, social, and political experimentation with new ideas and approaches, both imported from the old world and spawned in the new, were allowed to flourish, often unfettered.”53 This last point is also the reason this study devotes more attention to colonial capitalist transformations than to metropolitan ones. Primitive accumulation and capitalist innovation flourished “unfettered” in the colonies because they were located “beyond the line” of jus publicum Europeaum, that is, beyond the laws, customs, and conventions that limited the use of force and fraud in economic competition, social struggle, and political conflict in Europe54: The “inside” encompassed the laws, institutions, and customs of the mother country . . . The “outside,” by contrast, was characterized by imperial domination, the expropriation of vast territories, decimation of indigenous peoples, theft of their resources, enslavement, and the domination of vast tracts of land by private capitalists . . . In these imperial dependencies, the rules of the inside did not apply . . . violence defied the law, and bold physical coercion by private actors remade markets.55 It is tempting to perceive in this description an international order bifurcated between the norm-bound spaces of Europe and exceptional spaces of the colonies. Yet, as Antony Anghie has compellingly shown, far from existing in a legal void untouched by European international public law, colonial spaces were constituted as unbound by norms through a hierarchical differentiation within the one and same sphere of international law.56 Molding colonial territories into the peripheries of the capitalist world economy turned in great measure on defining them as “exceptional zones of armed expropriation” and designating their inhabitants as “expropriable subjects . . . shorn of political protection, ripe and ready for confiscation.”57 Furthermore, as Nikhil Singh correctly observes, the colonies were domains not only for enacting plunder, that is, primitive accumulation (or accumulation by dispossession), but also for developing cuttingedge procedures, logics of calculation, circulation, abstraction, and infrastructure—the slaver’s management of human cargo, the camp, the prison, the forward military base—innovations that can proceed insofar as they are unfettered by legally protected human beings advancing new prejudices, built upon the old.58 Liberated from political, legal, or customary limits to expropriation, enslavement, and plunder, colonial entrepreneurs, such as planters, slave traders, merchants, and chartered company agents, found a much freer hand in in reshaping local systems of production and exchange wherever they managed to secure political or military predominance. Consequently, although various forms of coerced dispossession and bondage dotted the European landscape in the early modern period, the union of political power and capital birthed much more violent and much “primitive” methods of accumulation beyond the “civilized” pale 24 Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism of Europe. Brutal forms of economic extraction and exploitation in the colonies represented the “systemic edges” of capitalist expansion in the early modern period, where the scale and nature of the deep social transformations central to the

birth of the global capitalist order fell into sharper relief.59

### 2AC -- Link -- AT: Identity Politics

#### Discussions of identity are marginalized in educational spaces under the guise of being “difficult” or “unrelated” to the subject matter – their movement replicates this by refusing to engage with black scholars and activists in order to preserve the integrity of their anticapitalist movement.

Grant ’20 -- Derisa Grant is an assistant teaching professor at the University of Southern California Rossier School of Education and a consultant on equitable and inclusive pedagogy. Previously, she was an associate director of faculty development and pedagogy at Stanford University (Derisa Grant, 7-15-2020, "Why classroom conversations about diversity and identity shouldn't be framed as difficult (opinion)," No Publication, <https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2020/07/15/why-classroom-conversations-about-diversity-and-identity-shouldnt-be-framed>, accessed 7-2-2021) //nikki

Recently, I spoke with a white faculty member struggling to engage with two Latinx students in her art history seminar. Two of only a handful of nonwhite students in the class, the Latinx students repeatedly mentioned race -- of the artists, subjects and curators. To this instructor, not only were issues of race uncomfortable, but they were also tangential to the subject matter: art and representation. The students, the professor said, by harping on these concerns, had needlessly introduced this “difficult” topic into the classroom. Conversations about race, class, sexuality and other identities are often called “difficult” or “uncomfortable.” Mastering these conversations is necessary, it is often said, because shifting student demographics in higher education, including the increased enrollment of historically underrepresented students, require faculty members to gain facility discussing identity. This rationale is well intentioned as, on the surface, it suggests that faculty must adopt culturally responsive pedagogical practices to meet student needs. Additionally, this framing is potentially learner-centered, as it acknowledges that the discomfort of these “difficult” conversations must be braved to serve student learning and well-being. And, given the recent widespread protests over the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and Ahmaud Arbery, among others, professors who seek to carry on with business as usual, without broaching topics such as systemic racism and anti-Blackness, risk appearing tone-deaf and out of step with the current historical moment. Yet by linking the necessity of these conversations to changing student demographics or current events, we suggest that identity is relevant only when students who have been labeled “diverse” are present and/or when those students call attention to identity. Only when students of color are in the classroom, for example, must we acknowledge race, or only when there are women in predominately male spaces must we recognize gender. Thus, this justification for these conversations displaces the notion of “difficult” onto students who are labeled diverse. Not only are such conversations “difficult,” but the existence and very presence of these students becomes difficult. Were these Latinx students not in the class, or were they not vocal about race, the art history professor implied, there would be no discomfort. This framing also furthers the fiction that when women, first-generation students, low-income students, students with disabilities, transgender students and so forth are in the classroom, faculty members must put aside identity-neutral content and attend to identity. The reality, however, is that all students benefit when a multiplicity of identities are reflected in the classroom, whether in the curriculum or elsewhere. “Difficult” allows us to dismiss and avoid -- to further marginalize those who surface identity by labeling them myopic or as promoting identity politics. Yet all course content reflects identity politics. For example, in my conversations with STEM faculty members, I often hear that their disciplines are evidence-based and identity-free. But when prodded, those same instructors might admit to not assigning readings with women as the lead authors, to assuming a level of prior knowledge in introductory classes that favors students from upper-middle-class high schools or to having group projects in which female students often assume a housekeeping role (e.g., note taker). In other words, these instructors eventually admit that underrepresented students do not introduce identity into the classroom, but rather identity is always present in the classroom. Identity is enacted through readings, assignments, classroom structures and classroom norms -- choices made and identities prioritized by faculty members. The tragedy of the art history class is that the Latinx students attended to ideas that the professor should have considered: What groups have cultures worthy of preservation and celebration? Who decides? What historical processes have allowed the collectors and museums of one place to acquire the art of another? The instructor viewed the students’ considerations as tiresome and one-dimensional. But the students, in my reading, understood that complex human and historical forces shape art and representation. Content is not value neutral. Moreover, attending to identity should not depend on which students are present, and already-marginalized students should not be burdened with surfacing issues of identity. Identity informs all students’ and instructors’ experiences of the classroom, even the experiences of those from dominant groups. For example, years ago, I taught at a predominantly white institution. During the final class, a student who identified as white, male and upper middle class advocated removing poor children from their families and placing them in boarding schools. This conversation, initiated by a student holding dominant identities, could very well be described as difficult. As an instructor, I was forced to confront a perspective different from my own -- one that I was shocked to learn my student held and one that I personally found reprehensible. I felt stunned, but given that the student had made the comment in front of 49 other students, I also felt pressured to immediately respond. Therefore, in order to give the student an opportunity to hear how outrageous his statement was and to clarify, I repeated what he had said and asked if I had understood correctly. When the student affirmed his position, I then opened the conversation to all students and asked them to respond with reference to texts we’d read that semester on topics such as assimilation and culturally relevant pedagogy. In the discussion, the class countered their peer’s position using literature. I wrapped up the discussion by thanking the student for surfacing the issue and by summarizing the key concerns that his peers had raised. The reality is that conversations about identity challenge us. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the negative affective responses -- including shame (over one’s lack of knowledge), fear (that one’s biases might be exposed) and defensiveness -- that these conversations evoke. Spaces of Practice Yes, conversations about identity challenge us. Yet, note that I use the verb “challenge,” rather than the modifier “challenging.” This is not simply semantics. Though these conversations may be difficult to navigate, I would not call them “difficult.” This modifier suggests that identity is inherently troublesome -- a notion that deserves interrogation. Evan P. Apfelbaum and other scholars have found that as adolescents learn social norms, they also begin to understand that it is socially unacceptable to discuss race. I wonder, could this finding be extended to other identities, such as socioeconomic class and sexuality? (Would you feel comfortable, for example, asking your colleague her salary?) As a shorthand, calling certain conversations “uncomfortable” allows for continued silence. This euphemism gestures toward identity but allows us to avoid directly naming class, race, sexual orientation, gender, disability or other identities we have grown accustomed to not naming. Perhaps conversations about identity are “difficult” not because they are inherently uncomfortable, but because they have been deemed ineffable. Consequently, the first time many faculty members -- particularly those who view themselves and their disciplines as identity neutral -- are forced to consider and articulate their stance on identity is in the classroom. Perhaps that occurs after a student says something racist or otherwise derogatory, and the instructor must fumble to respond while a room of nervous students watches. But what if these conversations are not actually difficult, but simply unpracticed? In other words, the classroom context and lack of prior engagement with the topic might make the conversation difficult, but the topic itself is not, I would offer, inherently difficult. Therefore, perhaps faculty members need not fewer conversations about identity but more. Specifically, suppose they had spaces in which to understand the scholarship on diversity and inclusion, as well as opportunities to consider implications to their teaching practices? I imagine, for example, that it is rare to find faculty who object to inclusive classrooms. However, it might be rarer still to find instructors who can define an “inclusive” classroom, identify strategies for fostering one or articulate what students experience in one. If faculty had spaces of practice, they could gain facility identifying strategies for fostering expected and unexpected conversations about identity and for incorporating identity meaningfully into a class from the first day. They wouldn’t just believe, for example, that including a sole Toni Morrison text to represent Black writers in a literature class or asking gender pronouns in a science class will make these courses more inclusive. Through faculty communities of practice, identity conversations move from “difficult” and “uncomfortable” to manageable and educative -- and serve as important opportunities to model for students how to talk and think about identity.

#### Identity politics is critical to the success of social movements – it doesn’t divide movements but rather unites them in a broader struggle for equality, marginalization divides movements not identity politics.

Garza ’19 -- Alicia Garza is an American civil rights activist and writer known for co-founding the international Black Lives Matter movement (Alicia Garza, 9-24-2019, "Identity Politics: Friend or Foe?," Othering & Belonging Institute, <https://belonging.berkeley.edu/identity-politics-friend-or-foe>, accessed 7-2-2021) //nikki

The term “identity politics” was first coined by Black feminist Barbara Smith and the Combahee River Collective in 1974. Identity politics originated from the need to reshape movements that had until then prioritized the monotony of sameness over the strategic value of difference. The “second wave” feminist movement fought for body autonomy, pushed for women’s equality and demanded that women be treated as human beings. However, much like the first wave of feminism, which was largely centered around women’s suffrage and gaining the right to vote, white women became the default standard for all women. While segregation was no longer formally the law of the land in 1974, racism and discrimination based on class was still deeply embedded in efforts to achieve change, again, because the change desired was progress for white women and not all women. Women who identified as feminists were encouraged to join together on the basis of a common experience of discrimination based on sex, with no attention paid to the fact that not all women’s experiences were the same, and further, that sex was not a category that could adequately describe gender. This is the context for the emergence of identity politics. Stated simply, identity politics is the assertion that “the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression.”1 The Combahee River Collective detailed how their experiences as Black women were different than those of white women, and this mattered because understanding the ways in which racial, economic, gender, and other oppressions were linked and shaped their lives helped to make sure that no one could be left behind. The purpose of this paper is to explore “identity politics” and whether or not it is a useful tool for civic engagement and movements today. In this paper, I argue that identity politics is not only widely misunderstood, but intentionally distorted in order to avoid acknowledging the ways in which “identity” shapes the economy, our democracy, and our society. I explore the Black feminist origins of identity politics, and explore how and why identity politics is being weaponized among progressives and conservatives—and with what consequences for increased participation by marginalized groups in mainstream politics. Ultimately, I argue that identity politics is indeed a critical tool for organizing and civic engagement. Recognizing oneself and one’s experiences in politics is a motivating factor for participation in that which is political. At a moment when America is facing some of the sharpest political polarization that it has seen in decades, anyone looking to secure the participation of marginalized groups had better start acknowledging that they’re marginalized in the first place, and second, working to design policy solutions that leave no one behind. What We Get Wrong about Identity Politics Leaving no one behind is ideal, and, despite the best intentions, people are always getting left behind in social movements—particularly when the differences that emerge as a result of various forms of oppression are erased or intentionally ignored. Social change work is a series of scientific experiments. In experiments, to determine whether or not change has occurred, you have to have a control. The control in a scientific experiment is, by definition, a sample that remains the same through an experiment. The control helps you to determine whether or not change has happened. The control must remain the same or equal at all times to ensure accurate measurement of results. In social change movements in America, the control is often based on the progress that white people are making in their lives against a white standard. In the women’s movement, for example, the measure of progress is taken as whether or not change and progress is happening in the lives of white women. It’s well known that there is a lack of parity in wages between cisgender (people for whom their gender assigned at birth matches their gender identity) men and women. On average, cisgender women make 85 cents to every dollar a cisgender man makes.2 Women of all racial and ethnic groups make less than their male counterparts, and also make less than white men. Black women make 65.3 cents to every dollar that a white man makes, and 89 cents to every dollar a Black man makes. Latinx women make 61.6 cents to every dollar that a white man makes, and 85.7 percent of what a Latinx man makes. Among Latinx transgender and gender non-conforming people, 28 percent reported making less than $10,000 a year, and 34 percent of Black transgender and gender non-conforming people report the same.3 It is significant that discussions of the gender wage gap often start off with the assumption that all women make 85 cents to every dollar men make, since that is only true for white women. Without this qualification, one might think that all women make 80 cents to each dollar a man makes. Time and time again, the experiences of white communities are used as the framework from which to understand inequality, and yet the communities experiencing inequality from a range of factors, all at the same time, are communities of color. From abortion rights to pay equity, comparing the conditions of white women to white men has been the way to assess whether or not change is actually happening and progress is being made. Identity politics holds us accountable to ask more questions about for whom progress is being made. The significant gaps in wages for Black and Latinx women indicate that while some are making progress, others continue to lag behind. Identity politics says that no longer should we be expected to fight against someone else’s oppression without fighting against our own, too. The Combahee River Collective was concerned with how our lived experiences shape our lives, and identity politics offered social movements, like the women’s movement, the gift of uncovering what had been ignored or devalued. Black women who were poor and working class wanted feminism as much as white middle-class women did. Identity politics not only showed Black women that we were worthy of feminism—worthy of being treated as human beings—but it also gave white middle class women the gift of understanding that for feminism to succeed, feminism could not pretend that the world revolves around the struggle for parity between white women and white men. Whiteness as the Standard The worldview and experiences of white communities is also shaping the debate about identity politics. Racial identity is an invented series of social categories which have impacts on power and agency socially, economically, and politically. Though race is socially constructed, it has material and practical implications for the lives of those who have been assigned racial categories at the losing end of the spectrum of power. Racial categorizations that fall on the side of the spectrum that are non-white tend to lack power and agency vis-à-vis those that are on the white side of the spectrum. Whiteness in America functions the same way that a “control” does in an experiment. In an experiment, to measure whether or not change has happened, you have to have a control—largely considered to be a standard against which change is compared. You know if change has occurred through your experiment when the entity being experimented on changes as a result of your intervention—because the control does not change. In the social experiment called America, progress or change is determined by whether or not conditions have changed for white people and against a white standard. Another way to look at this is not as an experiment, but instead, through the lens of what is considered “normal.” If I go to the store right now and look for Band-Aids, the color will be compatible with white skin, not mine. If I look for a pair of pantyhose, it’s not as likely I’ll find a shade that matches my skin. And up until a year ago, it was close to impossible for women of color to find shades of foundation. In America, “nude” or “flesh-toned” means white. Again, the standard in America is what is white—what appeals to white people, what makes sense to white people, what activates and motivates white people, and so on. It’s not just true at the beauty store—it’s true throughout the economy, our democracy, and the rest of our society. If whiteness is the standard, it also is the criteria used to determine whether ideas, actions, or experiences have worth, merit, or value. Whiteness attempts to determine what is valid. Too often, whiteness dismisses the experiences and worldviews of people who are not white, because the opinions, values, needs, and beliefs of people who are not white are not considered to have merit, particularly when compared to whiteness. When the Black Lives Matter movement exploded across the world, whiteness worked to define whether or not the anger of Black people was legitimate and justified, and at the same time, whiteness attempted to redefine the movement as dangerous, aimless, misguided, and violent. Whiteness attempted to de-fang the power of Black Lives Matter as a slogan and a rallying cry with “All Lives Matter” effectively erasing any mention of race. Changing “Black Lives Matter” to “All Lives Matter” turns what was a discourse on structural racism, police, and other forms of state violence into a two-dimensional conversation where race either does or doesn’t matter. Race-neutral language is a core tenet of whiteness—race, and racial oppression or racial exclusion, is made invisible on the surface while at the same time being allowed to organize the economy, democracy, and society. Whiteness is the control and the standard because whiteness is fundamentally about power. Whiteness attempts to shape worldviews, ideas, and experiences because whiteness seeks to maintain the power it has been afforded, and subsequently affords to people who have been designated as white, for the purposes of implementing whiteness and, as such, implementing power. The debate over identity politics is no exception to this rule. Not everyone sees identity politics as a gift. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, a plethora of articles appeared in news outlets, slamming “liberal identity politics.” Television pundits began to decry “identity politics” as the reason that Democrats lost the presidential election. There are a number of arguments that are deployed against identity politics, and they are deployed for a number of reasons. One such argument declares that a fixation on diversity renders people incapable of seeing outside of their own experience, preventing them from being able to build relationships with those who do not share their experiences. And, in the political realm, they argue that a focus on differences, rather than what we share in common, is a strategic mistake in elections. It is worth noting that these arguments are primarily deployed towards those who are not white. These arguments rest on the notion that identity politics, as they define them, leave people out—and yet they fail to acknowledge that the politics of identity are not responsible for the prevalence of those identities. Identity is only important when—through no fault of your own—you are assigned an identity that promises worse life outcomes than those who are not assigned an identity that is marginalized from power. Following the logic of contrarians of identity politics, no one should pay attention to the fact that being assigned “Black” almost guarantees that your life chances will be worse than someone who is assigned a “white” identity, because it could alienate a white person and leave them out of the conversation. Instead of addressing the fact that Black people are more likely to die in childbirth than white people, that Black people with disabilities are eight times more likely to be shot and killed by police than their white counterparts, that Black people on average are twice as likely to be poor or to be unemployed than white people, or that white households are 13 times as wealthy as Black households, critics of identity politics would prefer we not address these disparities, for fear of alienating people who are not experiencing them. The real problem in America isn’t identity politics and making difference visible—it’s that those discrepancies exist in the first place. Critics of identity politics, intentionally or unintentionally, uphold a logic of whiteness that functions in similar ways to that of the edict presented in the movie The Wizard of Oz—they want you to pay no attention to the man behind the curtain. Does Identity Politics Bridge or Divide? Another fallacy from critics of identity politics is that identifying and addressing differences somehow prevent people with different histories, backgrounds, ethnicities, identities, or experiences from finding commonality. For example, Black communities are not the only ones who suffer from the ways in which whiteness distributes power unevenly in favor of white communities. Communities who are not white are not a monolith—and communities who share an experience of marginalization or disenfranchisement can and often do come together, across their differences, to end that marginalization. But this doesn’t and shouldn’t mean that they leave their identities at the door. Just like Black communities experience the negative effects of entrenched white power, so do Latinx communities, Arab communities, Muslim communities, Pacific Islander communities, Asian diasporic communities, and so on. To be clear, these communities do not just come together because they are marginalized. They come together to achieve a common goal—freedom and equality for all of us. Critics of identity politics are correct when they caution that a focus primarily on experience can detract from building alliances or developing a plan of action. That certainly is true when identity politics isn’t geared towards shifting the balance of power. However, critics of identity politics should be careful not to paint with such a broad brush. The Combahee River Collective wasn’t a knitting circle—they were a group of Black women, many of whom identified as lesbian and poor, who pushed the movements they should have been a part of to be more effective in acknowledging the impacts of race, class, gender, disability and more on the issues they were trying to impact, together, for the sake of the collective. Demanding that anyone divorce their lived experience from their participation in political action is not only dangerous, but it serves to reinforce power dynamics that are bad for the collective. What’s ironic about the controversy surrounding identity politics is that few seem to take issue with the white identity politics shaping our lives. The critiques of identity politics only arise when those who are marginalized and disconnected from power assert that their experiences matter, and demand action to ensure that they can, in fact, achieve parity socially, economically, and politically with whites. In the lead up to the 2016 Presidential election, Donald Trump ran on the slogan of “Make America Great Again.” Making America great again insinuated that America was great before, leaving one to ask: “What are we trying to restore America to, and what are we trying to change it from?” Throughout the campaign, the answer became clear—America, apparently, was great before its demographics changed, before women had rights, before Black people could stand up for their rights, and so on. The America invoked by Trump was an America run and dominated by white, Christian, heterosexual men. That America was powered by blue-collar manufacturing jobs, and in that America, people of color, women, and others did not have equal rights to white men. In that America, the one that Trump and before him President Ronald Reagan idealized, it was illegal for Black people to share public accommodations with white people. The problem that those who decried identity politics had, then, was with what identity politics did when used to empower those who lacked power—in society, in the economy, and in American democracy. Identity politics is a threat to those who hold and wield power, because it destabilizes the control against which all else is compared. Identity politics is a threat to white power because it asserts that whiteness has shaped all of our lives in ways that do not benefit us—even those who possess that privilege. Far from being an edict of political correctness, identity politics asks us to see the world as it actually is, and more than that, it demands that we equalize the playing field. Those who claim that identity politics is counterproductive and divisive often seek to build movements on that which they claim we all have in common, and cite economic status as an equalizer that everyone can get behind. Yet in an economy that is racialized and gendered, such notions are wishful thinking at best, and willful ignorance at worst. The Consequences of a False Debate The fight over identity politics is a false one; it forces false choices and even worse, inauthentic ones. Conservative movements have identified race and gender in particular as arenas where neutrality is strategic to maintain white, heterosexual, male, cisgendered power, at the expense of everyone who does not occupy those social positions. They have identified that inequality resulting from race and gender, and other social indicators that have economic implications, is best left undiscussed, lest it be uncovered that there are people that benefit from the disenfranchisement and oppression of marginalized communities. Simultaneously, the same forces inside of liberal and progressive movements have adopted the same stance, using talking points from conservatives to justify their resistance to upending oppressions other than that resulting from economic inequality. This, of course, has consequences for progressive movements and civic engagement efforts. A refusal to acknowledge inequities inside of a movement almost guarantees that those inequities will not be addressed in any substantive way, which guarantees that the lives of those who depend on transformative social movements the most will not change in any substantive way. We should be concerned about this because it is, in fact, exactly the agenda that our opposition hopes to achieve—no real substantive changes in the relationships of power, or their outcomes.